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EDUCATING FOR PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: EDUCATIONAL




The legal profession increasingly has recognized that American law
schools do not adequately educate their students for the practice of law.'
In response to that concern, I asked the faculty of the Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law to approve a new educational program entitled "Dispute
Resolution: Litigation and Its Alternatives."' 2 It did so on October 20,
1992. The program will begin with the class admitted for the 1993-94
academic year.
The new dispute resolution program is designed to give students a
comprehensive and balanced professional education to prepare them ade-
quately for the practice of law, with a concentration in litigation and
Copyright © 1993 by Gary S. Laser
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, Chicago-Kent College Of
Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
I wish to acknowledge the important legal research on this paper conducted by my research
assistants, Brian Saucier and Joel Berg, and thank them for their helpful comments and suggestions.
I also wish to thank many other research assistants and other students and colleagues with whom I
have discussed my theories of legal education. Of course, any defects or errors are my own.
1. See, e.g., Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Legal Education and Professional
Development-An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEc. LEGAL EDUC. & ADM. BAR 5 [herein-
after ABA Task Force Report] ("Surveys understandably indicate that practicing lawyers believe
that their law school training left them deficient in skills that they were forced to acquire after
graduation."); John Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or If the Professor Must Publish,
Must the Profession Perish, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343, 345-46 (1989) ("The most obvious failing of the
traditional law school curriculum is that its three-year concentration on legal doctrine as an objec-
tively rational subject of discourse results in the neglect of a multitude of competencies that mark the
excellent practitioner."); John 0. Mudd, Beyond Rationalism: Performance-Referenced Legal Edu-
cation, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 189-91 nn.1-9 (1986) (citing a number of articles and studies which
argue that law schools do not adequately educate their law students for the. practice of law and that
this has been a concern of the profession ever since the inception of law schools).
The Legal Realists recognized the lack of adequate preparation and proposed educational re-
form including expanded clinical education more than fifty years ago. See Jerome Frank, A Plea for
Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81
U. PA. L. REv. 907 (1933); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 211 (1948); Karl N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1935).
2. The program curriculum was developed during the summer of 1992 by Dean Richard
Matasar and me, in consultation with the Chicago-Kent clinical faculty and several members of the
law school's non-clinical faculty.
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alternative methods of resolving conflict.3 Because the program is exper-
imental, it will be limited to 30 students in each class. Yearly, up to three
graduates of the program will be eligible for selection as Research Fel-
lows who will spend a fourth year at the Law School.
The curriculum of the new program includes a significant number of
traditional legal method and doctrinal courses. It requires theoretical
and practical education in the fundamental lawyering skills, such as legal
research and writing, as well as classroom and simulated education in the
other basic lawyering skills. It requires education in the fundamental
lawyering values, including the professional and social responsibilities of
lawyers, and the role of lawyers and the legal profession in promoting
justice. Finally, it requires an extensive and concentrated education in
the "art of lawyering" 4-the additional body of knowledge needed when
applying legal doctrine, skills, and values in the real world of practice.
The art of lawyering will be learned through live-client clinical education
under close faculty supervision in an environment resembling real
practice.
The dispute resolution program is designed with important underly-
ing assumptions regarding the knowledge and education lawyers need
before they undertake fully their roles as members of the legal profession.
First, it assumes that, in addition to knowledge of legal doctrine and legal
method, lawyers need knowledge of all the fundamental skills and val-
ues5 that competent, ethical, and socially responsible practitioners use in
solving legal problems. Second, it assumes they need knowledge of the
art of lawyerng. 6 Third, it assumes that a significant amount of educa-
tion in legal doctrine, skills, and values as well as education in the art of
lawyering should occur in law school. And finally, it assumes that law
students learn the art of lawyering best through reflective, live-client
clinical education in a realistic setting under the close supervision of ex-
perienced clinical professors. The program recognizes that legal doc-
3. To receive a J.D. degree from Chicago-Kent, students must earn 84 credits. To be awarded
a certificate for completing the new dispute resolution program, however, the students must success-
fully complete 90 credits as follows: They must take a minimum of 53 credits of traditional class-
room courses (General Knowledge-28, Legal Writing-7, Theory and Ethics-8, and Dispute
•Resolution-Doctrinal-lO) and a minimum of 25 credits from clinical and other non-traditional
courses (Clinical Education-18 and Dispute Resolution-Non-Doctrinal-7). The remaining 12
credits consist of 7 credits of distributional requirements in the Dispute Resolution curriculum and 5
credits of Electives and may be taken from the traditional or non-traditional curriculum. See the
Appendix for a detailed description of the new dispute resolution program.
4. I am indebted to Donald Schan, who speaks of the art of practice in the professions gener-
ally and whose work I discuss at some length. I apologize in advance to Mr. Sch6n for any
misinterpretations.
5. For a description of the fundamental lawyering skills and values, see infra part II.
6. For a description of this type of knowledge and education, see infra part III.
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trine, skills, and values-in contrast to the art of lawyering--can
continue to be taught in a classroom or simulated setting.
In sum, the new dispute resolution program offers an innovative
curriculum that stresses the connection between legal doctrine, skills,
and values, and the art of lawyering; it is one designed to educate the
students to become reflective practitioners with a lawyering identity de-
veloped during law school that incorporates high standards of compe-
tence, ethics, and social responsibility.
How can we ascertain the fundamental lawyering skills and values,
and what are they? What is the art of lawyering, and how is it best
learned? To what extent should all this education take place in law
school, and how should it be taught? Is the new dispute resolution pro-
gram well designed to meet its educational objectives? 7 These are the
questions that I shall address in this paper.
II. THE SKILLS AND VALUES
What are the fundamental skills and values that all lawyers should
know before assuming fully their roles as practicing members of the bar?
To determine what skills and values lawyers need, we should ascertain
what tasks lawyers perform (skills), how they solve legal problems (skills
and values), and how they meet their ethical and social obligations
(values).
Only recently have law schools and the practicing bar given these
concerns the kind of concentrated attention they deserve. An increasing
number of articles and studies have begun to take a closer look at what
lawyers do, how they solve problems, and what their professional and
social obligations are.8 These articles also define and analyze the funda-
7. For those law students who do not intend to practice, the new dispute resolution program
may not be as appropriate.
8. See, e.g., FRANCES K. ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC
PROFESSION (1981); Victor G. Rosenblum, Educational Change and The Competent Lawyer, in
MAKING THE COMPETENT LAWYER: MODELS FOR LAW SCHOOL ACTION tab 1 (Standing Commit-
tee on Lawyer Competence ed., 1990); Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the
Construction of Competence (American Bar Foundation Working Paper No. 9212, 1992); ABA Task
Force Report, supra note 1, at 379 app. b (summarizing Garth & Martin, supra).
A rich and diverse literature concerning what it is that lawyers do has emerged from the clinical
education movement. See, eg., GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS:
MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 304-05 (1977); DAVID A. BINDER & SU-
SAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH
(1977); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS To PROOF (1984);
DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1990);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering, 29 CLEv. ST.
L. REV. 555 (1980).
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mental lawyering skills and values. 9
In the past,
law professors have mistaken one aspect of lawyering, the cognitive or
rational dimension, to be the whole of lawyer performance, and they
have structured legal education accordingly. To overcome this con-
ceptual barrier requires looking beyond the curriculum to the world of
lawyering in all its dimensions as the proper starting point for evaluat-
ing a law school's academic program. 10
In the absence of a sound empirical analysis of what lawyers do and thus
need to know:
[e]veryone who has addressed the problem of defining lawyers' skills
has had no choice but to extrapolate from his own experience and
knowledge, and as a result there has been little agreement beyond the
tautological observation that the fundamental skill acquired by law
students is "learning to think like a lawyer."' 1
A major step in examining the world of practice and in seeking wide-
spread acceptance of a definition of lawyering skills and values occurred
last summer with the issuance of a report by the American Bar Associa-
tion's Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession ("ABA Task
Force"), entitled Legal Education and Professional Development-An
Educational Continuum ("ABA Task Force Report"). 12 Formed to eval-
uate the way in which law graduates are prepared for practice, the ABA
Task Force conducted what it described as an "in-depth study of the full
range of professional skills and values necessary for a lawyer to assume
professional responsibility for handling a legal matter."' 3 The second
section of the Task Force Report contains a comprehensive "Statement
of Fundamental Professional Skills and Values" ("SSV"). "4
The ABA Task Force Report has done important work for the pro-
fession in setting forth the ten fundamental skills and four fundamental
9. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 123-201; Mudd, supra note 1, at 198-200 (describ-
ing several attempts from the 1940s to 1980 to define the basic lawyering skills). See also Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Clinical Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 612 (1984); Elson,
supra note 1.
10. Mudd, supra note 1, at 191.
11. Id at 196 (quoting Barry Boyer & Roger Crampton, American Legal Education: Agenda for
Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L.Q. 221, 270 (1974)).
12. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1.
13. Id. at xi.
14. Id. at 135-221. The ABA Task Force recommends that the SSV "should be made available
to all entering law students to inform them about the skills and values they will be expected to
possess as lawyers and to help them seek appropriate educational opportunities in law school, in
work experiences, and in continuing legal education." Id at 331. To facilitate that goal, the SSV
was issued both as part of the ABA Task Force Report, id at 135-221, and in pamphlet form. Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Profes-
sional Values, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADM. BAR [hereinafter SSV Pamphlet] (describing
and commenting on each of the ten skills and four values).
[Vol. 68:243
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values with which it states that "every lawyer should be familiar prior to
assuming the full responsibilities of a member of the legal profession." 15
Although the ABA Task Force did not itself conduct an empirical
study of what practicing lawyers do, it considered recent empirical stud-
ies, 16 theoretical articles, 17 and the written and oral statements of practic-
ing lawyers, judges, and traditional and clinical law professors. The
ABA Task Force also had within its ranks considerable knowledge and
experience. It cannot be accused of mere "extrapolat[ion] from [its] own
experience and knowledge."' 8
The ten fundamental lawyering skills set forth in the SSV are:
1. Problem Solving: "The term 'problem' include[s] the entire range
of situations in which a lawyer's assistance is sought.... ."19 This skill
encompasses "identifying and diagnosing a problem, generating alter-
native solutions and strategies, developing a plan of action, implement-
ing the plan, and keeping the planning process open to new
information and ideas." 20
2. Legal Analysis and Reasoning: This skill encompasses "identifying
legal issues, formulating legal theories, elaborating and enhancing the
theories, and evaluating and criticizing the theories."'21
3. Legal Research: This skill encompasses "a working knowledge of
the nature of legal rules and legal institutions, the fundamental tools of
legal research, and the process of devising and implementing a coher-
ent and effective research design."
'22
4. Factual Investigation: This skill encompasses "determining
whether factual investigation is needed, planning an investigation, im-
plementing an investigative strategy, organizing information in an ac-
cessible form, deciding whether to conclude the investigation, and
evaluating the information that has been gathered." '23
5. Communication: This skill encompasses "both written and oral
forms of communication-in a wide variety of ways and in a wide
range of contexts."' 2
4
15. SSV Pamphlet, supra note 14, at 2.
16. See, e.g., ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 8; Marjorie A. McDiarmid, What's Going On
Down There In The Basement: In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
239 (1990); Garth & Martin, supra note 8.
17. For a full list see, ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at xi-xiv, 341-411 app. a-e.
18. Mudd, supra note 1, at 196.
19. SSV Pamphlet, supra note 14, at 15 n. 1. All cites to the ten fundamental skills and four
fundamental values are to the SSV Pamphlet and not the ABA Task Force Report.
20. Id. at 15. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60 for a discussion of the distinction be-
tween the skill of problem solving as opposed to the art of problem solving. See also infra note 60 for
a discussion of the educational implications of classifying problem solving as a "skill," not as both an
"art" and a "skill."
21. SSV Pamphlet, supra note 14, at 25.
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id. at 38.
24. Id. at 47.
1992]
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6. Counseling: This skill encompasses "establishing a proper coun-
seling relationship with a client, gathering information relevant to the
decision to be made by the client, analyzing the decision to be made by
the client, counseling the client about the decision, and implementing
the client's decision."
2 5
7. Negotiation: This skill encompasses "preparing for a negotiation,
conducting a negotiation, counseling a client about the terms obtained
from the other side in a negotiation, and implementing the client's
decision."
26
8. Litigation and Alternative Dispute-Resolution Procedures: This
skill encompasses "a working knowledge of the fundamentals of trial-
court litigation, appellate litigation, advocacy in administrative and ex-
ecutive forums, and alterative dispute resolution."
'2 7
9. Organization and Management of Legal Work: This skill encom-
passes "efficient management, including appropriate allocation of time,
effort and resources; timely performance and completion of work; co-
operation among co-workers; and orderly administration of the
office."
'28
10. Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas.29
The four fundamental lawyering values set forth in the SSV are:
1. Provision of Competent Representation: This value encompasses
"Attaining [and maintaining] a Level of Competence in One's Own
Field" 30 and "Representing Clients in a Competent Manner."1
31
2. Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality: This value en-
compasses such striving "in One's Own Daily Practice" and "Contrib-
uting to the Profession's Fulfillment of its Responsibility to Ensure
These include: communications designed to advocate or persuade (such as, for example,
written briefs; oral arguments on motions; bargaining with an adversary); to advise or in-
form (for example, opinion letters to a client; orally counseling or giving legal advice to a
client; briefing a senior partner); to elicit information (for example, interviews of clients or
witnesses; discovery letters, interrogatories, and other informal or formal requests for dis-
covery); and to establish legal obligations or effectuate legal transactions (for example,
drafting of contracts, wills, trust instruments, corporate charters, separation agreements,
leases, documents transferring interests in real property, consent decrees, statutes, and ad-
ministrative regulations).
Id.
25. Id. at 51.
26. Id. at 60.
27. Id. at 67. With regard to Skill 8, the SSV notes that:
[a]lthough there are many lawyers who do not engage in litigation or make use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms, even these lawyers are frequently in a position of hav-
ing to consider litigation or alternative dispute resolution as possible solutions to a client's
problem or to counsel a client about these options or to factor the options into planning for
negotiations. To accomplish these tasks, a lawyer needs to have at least a basic familiarity
with the aspects of litigation and alternative dispute resolution described in Skill § 8.
Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 76.
29. Id. at 80.
30. Id. at 87.
31. Id. at 88.
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that Adequate Legal Services Are Provided to Those Who Cannot Af-
ford to Pay for Them," and to "Enhance the Capacity of Law and
Legal Institutions to Do Justice."
32
3. Striving to Improve the Profession: This value encompasses "Par-
ticipating in Activities Designed to Improve the Profession;" "Assist-
ing in the Training and Preparation of New Lawyers and the
Continuing Education of the Bar;" and "Striving to Rid the Profession
of Bias Based on Race, Religion, Ethnic Origin, Gender, Sexual Orien-
tation, Age, or Disability and to Rectify the Effects of These Biases."
33
4. Professional Self-Development: This value encompasses "In-
creas[ing] One's Own Knowledge and Improv[ing] One's Own
Skills" 34 and "Selecting and Maintaining Employment That Will Al-
low the Lawyer to Develop As A Professional and To Pursue His or
Her Professional and Personal Goals."
35
The SSV is an important step forward in the profession's attempt to im-
prove the quality of both legal education and practice and the ABA Task
Force should be commended. 36 The SSV should be read by all law stu-
dents and lawyers, and I believe it will be the starting point for all serious
discussions regarding law school curriculum reform.
37
Acknowledging that the SSV is an excellent beginning does not
32. Id. at 93.
33. Id. at 96.
34. Id. at 98.
35. Id. at 99.
36. The ABA Task Force Report did not explicitly state the extent to which the skills and
values mentioned in the SSV should be taught either during law school through supervised mentor-
ing situations or after law school through continuing legal education. I consider this a weakness in
the Report, because I think it essential to teach all the fundamental skills and values during law
school. See infra part IV. The Report does correctly recognize, however, that the professional edu-
cation of lawyers should take place during the entire career of each lawyer and that the practicing
bar and the law school community have joint responsibility for such education. ABA Task Force
Report, supra note 1, at 3.
37. Another excellent formulation of the fundamental lawyering skills and values views these
competencies from the particular to the most general:
Masks specific to different practice specialties, such as drafting wills, taking depositions of
experts, planning for take-over battles, or arranging and closing real estate deals. At a
higher level of generality are behaviors common to a variety of lawyering practices across
specialty areas such as framing a problem to be solved from the unstructured ambiguous
welter of facts confronting the practitioner; creating innovative approaches to problem
solving; analyzing risks of alternative courses of action and planning strategic and tactical
approaches; learning rhetorical performance skills in contexts such as negotiation, trials,
and appellate arguments; planning and conducting thorough and creative fact gathering;
working cooperatively with colleagues to solve mutual problems; learning to interview and
counsel the client; learning to think and act from a partisan perspective; understanding and
coping with the economic realities of law practice; and developing methods for learning
from one's own learning experiences. A still higher level of generality encompasses the
dispositional working habits of practitioners which would include the development of com-
petence in their own judgment and ability, dedication to their professional duties, ethical
sensitivity, prudence in judgment, and the sensitivity and the assessment and cultivation of
personal relationships.
Elson, supra note 1, at 346.
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mean that the lists are perfect or that they could not have contained
different items. Preliminary data from a recent study indicates that, at
least for lawyers who will practice in private law firms, the "ability to
obtain and keep clients" 38 and the ability to inspire confidence39 are im-
portant skills which are not mentioned in the SSV. Also, it seems that as
society becomes more complex and lawyers more specialized, the insights
of other fields-such as economics and philosophy-in solving legal
problems will become an increasingly necessary component of a lawyer's
knowledge. The ABA Task Force itself recognizes that the SSV is not a
final product. It should and will be continually revised as the legal pro-
fession itself evolves and takes a deeper interest in studying what lawyers
do and how they deal with their professional and social obligations.
4°
III. THE ART OF LAWYERING: PRACTICE IN THE
INDETERMINATE ZONE
A. The Art of Lawyering as Knowledge
Although lawyers must know legal doctrine and fundamental lawy-
ering skills and values, such knowledge is not sufficient to enable lawyers
to perform as competent, ethical, and socially responsible practitioners.
To so perform, they need to acquire an additional body of knowledge
which lawyers use when applying legal doctrine, skills, and values in the
real world of practice.
My views on the importance of this type of knowledge have been
influenced by the work of Donald Sch6n, who uses the more general
phrase the "art of practice" and has written about professional knowl-
edge and education generally, not primarily about the legal profession.
41
In applying Sch6n's model to the legal profession, I have called the art of
practice the "art of lawyering."
The need for this additional knowledge results from the way in
which professionals encounter and solve problems: "in the varied topog-
raphy of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground overlooking a
swamp."' 42 "On the high ground," professional problem solving is often
based on the "application of research-based theory and technique, '43 by
which I understand Schon to mean knowledge gained from the tradi-
tional curricula of professional schools. Whereas in the "swampy low-
38. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 380.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 123-24.
41. DONALD SCH6N, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTIIONER (1987).
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id.
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land [of practice] messy, confusing problems defy technical solution." 44
Ironically, "the problems of the high ground tend to be relatively unim-
portant to individuals or society at large, however great their technical
interest may be, while in the swamp lie the problems of greatest human
concern."
'45
The dilemma of the professional is whether to "remain on the high
ground where he can solve relatively unimportant problems according to
prevailing standards of rigor, or ... descend to the swamp of important
problems and non-rigorous inquiry." 46 The difficulty is that "as we have
come to see with increasing clarity over the last twenty or so years, the
problems of real-world practice do not present themselves to practition-
ers as well-formed structures. Indeed, they tend not to present them-
selves as problems at all but as messy, indeterminate situations." 47 They
are indeterminate in that each such situation may involve "uncertainty,
uniqueness, and value conflict" 48 and thus cannot be resolved by the sim-
ple "application of research-based theory and technique." 49 But it is pre-
cisely these "indeterminate zones of practice" that are central to
professional practice.
Sch6n speaks of the art of practice in the following way:
We should start not by asking how to make better use of research-
based knowledge but by asking what we can learn from a careful exam-
ination of artistry, that is, the competence by which practitioners actu-
ally handle indeterminate zones of practice-however that competence
may relate to technical rationality ....
Inherent in the practice of the professional we recognize as unusually
competent is a core of artistry.
Artistry is an exercise of intelligence, a kind of knowing, though differ-
ent in crucial respects from our standard model of professional knowl-
edge. It is not inherently mysterious; it is rigorous in its own terms;
and we can learn a great deal about it-within what limits, we should
treat as an open question-by carefully studying the performance of
unusually competent performers.
In the terrain of professional practice, applied science and research-
based technique occupy a critically important though limited territory,
bounded on several sides by artistry. There are an art of problem
framing, an art of implementation, and an art of improvisation-all




47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 6.




There is "uncertainty" in most aspects of professional practice-in
how to resolve problems and in how to relate one aspect of the problem
to another. The artistry is in turning an "ill defined m6lange" 51 into a
well defined problem. When the problem is defined by the practitioner,
"[she] chooses and names the things [she] will notice."' 52 By the way she
defines the problem, she "selects things for attention and organizes them,
... and sets a direction for action."'5 3 Significantly, "depending upon our
disciplinary background, organizational roles, past histories, interests
and political/economic perspectives, we frame our problematical situa-
tions in different ways." 5
4
Problems regularly arise which are "unique." When the question
falls outside the categories of existing theory and technique, the practi-
tioner cannot treat it as an instrumental problem to be solved by apply-
ing one of the rules in her store of professional knowledge. The case is
not 'in the book.' If she is to deal with it competently, she must do so
by a kind of improvisation, inventing and testing in the situation strate-
gies of her own devising.
55
"Value conflicts" arise when "there are no clear and self-consistent
ends to guide the technical selection of means." 56 The practitioner will
not be able to resolve the professional problem successfully simply by
using her "research-based theory and technique."
Schbn's general model of professional knowledge applies well to the
legal profession. The practicing lawyer finds that to solve most
problems, knowledge of legal doctrine, skills, and values is not enough.
57
Most problems lie in the swamp and have some mixture of uncertainty,
uniqueness, and value conflict. Thus, their solution requires knowing an
additional body of knowledge, the art of lawyering.
Sch6n's art of practice consists of "an art of problem framing, an art
of implementation, and an art of improvisation. ' 58 It is important to
distinguish the "art" of problem solving from the "skill" of problem solv-
ing. In the SSV, the first fundamental lawyering skill is called "problem
solving."5 9 Its description of the skill of problem solving sounds similar
50. Id. at 13.




55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 6.
57. I am roughly equating knowledge of legal doctrine, skills, and values to Sch6n's applied
science and "research-based theory and technique."
58. See supra text accompanying note 50.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. See also ABA Task Force, supra note 1, at 141-
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to Schon's description of the art of practice. However, there is an enor-
mous difference between the "skill" of problem solving and the "art" of
problem solving.
In the legal profession, the "art" of problem solving is another way
of describing the art of lawyering. In an indeterminate environment,
"art" must be used to solve the problem because the problem will contain
uncertainty, uniqueness, or value conflict. The "skill" of problem solv-
ing, as complex as it may be, occurs on the high ground. It is a skill like
any other and in Sch6n's terms is based on "research-based theory and
technique." Thus, it may be applied to solve problems in a defined or
definite environment, but is insufficient to solve problems in an indeter-
minate environment.
In law practice, most problems lie in the indeterminate environ-
ment, where use of the art of problem solving is essential. The lawyer's
artistry or lack of artistry in dealing with the indeterminacies will have a
far greater impact on the success of her performance than has hitherto
been appreciated, even by those like the ABA Task Force, which has
recognized the importance of the skill of problem solving.6°
1. Uncertainty
The lawyer, in agreeing to represent a client, will be faced with both
factual and legal uncertainties. There is artistry in how the lawyer
frames the problem to her client in light of these uncertainties. Here,
problem framing will have an impact on the client's goals and objectives
in the case and on what action she authorizes the lawyer to take on her
behalf.
The ways in which the lawyer frames to herself each separate uncer-
tainty in the case and the way in which she balances all of the uncertain-
ties in framing the overall problem or problems of the case to herself are
also functions of her artistry. There is artistry in strategizing, given the
uncertainty of a client's or adversary's case. The lawyer must decide
whether the client should admit the weaknesses in her case as a preemp-
tive strike or ignore them in the hope that the other party will not iden-
tify them. The lawyer must decide whether to resolve a particular
51; SSV Pamphlet, supra note 14, at 15-24 (defining, describing, and commenting on the skill of
problem solving).
60. Failing to make a sharp distinction between the skill of problem solving and the art of
problem solving (the art of lawyering) has serious educational implications. Though the skill of
problem solving can be learned in law school through traditional classroom education and simula-
tion, the art of lawyering can be learned only through reflective, live-client clinical education. See
infra part III.D.
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factual uncertainty with or without aid of discovery. If she chooses dis-
covery, she must implement a discovery plan deciding which discovery
devices should she use, and in what order. With a legal uncertainty, such
as the likelihood of prevailing on a motion for summary judgment, decid-
ing whether to bring the motion and how to present the issue to the client
are also functions of the lawyer's artistry.
There is often much uncertainty in deciding whether to settle or go
to trial; some law firms bring in a different team of lawyers to negotiate,
for fear that their litigators would resolve the uncertainty in favor of go-
ing to trial for the unacceptable reason that litigators like to try cases.
There is artistry in evaluating the uncertainty present at trial-for exam-
ple whether the case is being well received by the judge and jury. Finally,
there is artistry in considering the uncertainties of an appeal. The art of
lawyering in the face of uncertainty involves the way in which the lawyer
selects and formulates the issues, organizes them, and chooses the strat-
egy for the case.6'
2. Uniqueness
Uniqueness is a hallmark of the legal profession. There is artistry in
deciding what factors to pull out of a case, or cases out of a line of cases,
because each client's problem presents a unique fact pattern. Moreover,
every person is a unique individual. How the lawyer deals with one cli-
ent will be different from how she deals with another, based on "swam-
plike" factors such as the emotions involved in the attorney-client
relationship and the client's way of handling the stresses of litigation.
Even when representing a client for a second time, the lawyer's relation-
ship with the client will be unique because there is a different problem
and there is a different opposing counsel, judge, or jury. Not only does
each individual bring her own uniqueness to the situation, but each con-
stellation of individuals presents the lawyer with a unique problem. The
art of lawyering in the context of uniqueness requires "a kind of improvi-
sation, inventing and testing in the situation strategies of [her] own devis-
ing."'62 It requires improvisation because the uniqueness of the situation
means the lawyer has to respond to a situation she has not seen before.
3. Value Conflict
Value conflict arises frequently in law practice as well. There is al-
ways the tension between pressing hard to further the client's goal and
61. See SCH6N, supra note 41, at 4.
62. Id. at 5.
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recognizing the lawyer's ethical obligations. It may be that the client's
actions or goals, though not in conflict with the lawyer's professional
responsibility, are at odds with the lawyer's own personal values. The
lawyer may be repulsed by a client's desire for revenge, or may want
revenge herself because she has overidentified with the client's case (even
where the client would rather settle and be done with it). A young asso-
ciate may find morally repugnant something the senior partner wants her
to do. Situations of value conflict present a serious problem for lawyers
because "there are no clear and self-consistent ends to guide the technical
selection of means." 63
In the presence of uncertainty, uniqueness, or value conflict, the
lawyer cannot rely solely on her knowledge of legal doctrine, skills, and
values to resolve the problem. She is in a swamp; and thus, she needs to
use the art of lawyering as well.
B. Learning the Art of Lawyering: The Reflective Practicum
Traditionally lawyers learned basic legal doctrine, legal method, and
legal research and writing in law school. They honed their skills in these
areas and learned the rest--specialized legal doctrine, the whole range of
lawyering skills, the basic lawyering values, and the art of lawyering-
after graduation. The lawyers obtained this knowledge either from their
own experiences, from other lawyers for whom they worked or with
whom they collaborated, or from continuing legal education programs.
Schon is most concerned with the educational question of how pro-
fessionals learn the artistry of their professions. Learning the art of lawy-
ering presupposes that the lawyer (or law student) has learned or
contemporaneously is learning the relevant legal doctrine, skills, and val-
ues. Sch6n describes three ways in which a professional can acquire that
additional body of knowledge which he calls the artistry of practice:
"Rarely, he may learn the practice on his own, as people sometimes learn
hunting, carpentry, or the criminal trades. He may become an appren-
tice to senior practitioners, as many craftsmen, industrial workers, and
professionals still do. Or he may enter a practicum." 64
Sch6n is skeptical about the value of learning the art of practice "on
one's own." He states that learning the artistry of practice "on one's own
has the advantage of freedom-freedom to experiment without the con-
straints of received views. But it also has the disadvantage of requiring
each student to reinvent the wheel, gaining little or nothing from the
63. Id. at 6.
64. Id. at 37.
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accumulated experience of others."'65
He also finds fault with learning the artistry of practice through ap-
prenticeship, even though it "offers direct exposure to real conditions of
practice and patterns of work. But most offices, factories, firms, and clin-
ics are not set up for the demanding tasks of initiation and education.
Pressures for performance tend to be high; time, at a premium; and mis-
takes costly.
'"66
Sch6n concludes that such learning should take place in a practicum
which he describes as
a setting designed for the task of learning a practice. In a context that
approximates a practice world, students learn by doing, although their
doing usually falls short of real-world work. They learn by undertak-
ing projects that simulate and simplify practice; or they take on real-
world projects under close supervision. The practicum is a virtual
world, relatively free of the pressures, distractions, and risks of the real
one, to which, nevertheless, it refers .... It is also a collective world in
its own right, with its own mix of materials, tools, languages, and ap-
preciations. It embodies particular ways of seeing, thinking, and doing
that tend, over time, as far as the student is concerned, to assert them-
selves with increasing authority.
67
Sch6n calls the educational environment in which the art of practice is
learned a "reflective practicum. '68 To understand why the reflective
practicum is the best way to learn the art of practice requires an under-
standing of how a novice first approaches the "swampy lowland," those
important aspects of problems which contain elements of uniqueness, un-
certainty, and value conflict.
The student's knowledge of "research-based theory and tech-
nique" 69 does not address these elements. Thus, when the student comes
across a "swamp" problem, she must use what Sch6n calls her "tacit




68. Id. at 18. The theory of reflection as a specific part of the law school clinical education
curriculum was also discussed at great length in Kenneth Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer
Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical
Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284 (1981). But see Robert Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The
Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986) (critiquing should concern
the judicial system, not self-assessment).
69. Not all professional problems contain elements of uniqueness, uncertainty, or value conflict.
Sch6n states that in situations that do not contain these elements, it is possible to solve the problem
with a routine application of existing rules and procedures to the fact of particular problematic
situations. SCH6N, supra note 41, at 35. It is not clear whether any lawyering problem involving a
client does not contain at least uncertainty and uniqueness.
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or from other experiences relevant to the professional problem at hand.70
This knowledge of the art of practice is often characterized as knowledge
of how problems are solved or the procedures used in solving problems
(knowledge of "an art of problem framing, an art of implementation, and
an art of improvisation" 71). Prior to using their tacit knowledge, profes-
sionals may not know they have such knowledge, and even if they do
know it, they probably cannot easily describe it.
In everyday life, we bring our tacit knowledge to bear on problems
by what Sch6n calls "knowing-in-action":
the sorts of knowledge we reveal in our intelligent action-publicly
observable, physical performances like riding a bicycle and private op-
erations like instant analysis of a balance sheet. In both cases, the
knowing is in the action. We reveal it by our spontaneous, skillful
execution of the performance; and we are characteristically unable to
make it verbally explicit. Nevertheless, it is sometimes possible, by ob-
serving and reflecting on our actions, to make a description of the tacit
knowing implicit in them. Our descriptions are different kinds depend-
ing upon our purposes and the languages of description available to us.
We may refer, for example, to the sequences of operations or proce-
dures we execute; the clues we observe and the rules we follow; or the
values strategies, or assumptions that make up our "theories" of
action.
72
In professional problem solving we use "knowing-in-practice," dis-
tinguished from "knowing-in-action" because the knowing "is exercised
in the institutional settings particular to the professional, organized in
terms of its characteristic units of activity and its familiar types of prac-
tice situations, and constrained or facilitated by its common body of pro-
fessional knowledge and its [values]." 73 When the professional is solving
a problem which contains elements of uncertainty, uniqueness, and value
conflict, her "knowing-in-practice" will include her tacit knowledge in
addition to her knowledge of "research-based theory and technique."
For the student to be educated through a reflective practicum, she
must not merely engage in the performance of a lawyering activity
through "knowing-in-practice," but also must analyze the performance
while it takes place and afterwards. Sch6n refers to this activity (when-
ever it occurs) as reflection. Through reflection, the tacit knowing in the
action is recognized and considered. He calls the reflection which occurs
while the student is engaged in the performance "reflection-in-action;"
70. To see how the students' lack of tacit knowledge is overcome by the reflective practicum,
see infra part III.C.
71. SCH1iN, supra note 41, at 13.
72. Id. at 25.
73. Id. at 33.
19921
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
when it occurs again, afterwards, he refers to it as "reflection on our past
reflection-in-action." 
74
Sch6n emphasizes the necessity for "reflection-in-action. '75 Be-
cause professional problems arise in an "indeterminate environment,"
"[r]outine responses [may] produce a surprise-an unexpected outcome,
pleasant or unpleasant, that does not fit the categories of our knowing-in-
action. Inherent in a surprise is the fact that it gets our attention.
'76
Surprises occur because the student is solving problems in an indetermi-
nate environment, and her knowledge of legal doctrine, skills, and values
is insufficient. Faced with the indeterminacy, she uses tacit knowledge to
solve the problem, knowledge the student may never have realized that
she had. A professional uses tacit knowledge when "she responds to the
unexpected or anomalous by restructuring some of her strategies of ac-
tion, theories of phenomena, or ways of framing the problem; and she
invents on-the-spot experiments to put her new understandings to the
test."
77
Just as surprise leads to the use of tacit knowledge, it should also
lead simultaneously to "reflection-in-action." Sch6n points out that "re-
flection-in-action"
has a critical function, questioning the assumptional structure of
knowing-in-action. We think critically about the thinking that got us
into this fix or this opportunity; and we may, in the process, restruc-
ture strategies of action, understandings of phenomena, or ways of
framing problems .... Reflection gives rise to on-the-spot experiment.
We think up and try out new actions intended to explore the newly
observed phenomena, test our tentative understandings of them, or af-
firm the moves we have invented to change things for the better.78
But just because the student has been surprised and has used tacit
knowledge to help her solve a professional problem does not mean that
she will engage in "reflection-in-action." The student may reflect on the
professional activity only after she has completed it. On the other hand,
the student may engage in "reflection-in-action" and then reflect on the
activity again after she has completed it. Since reflecting at both stages is
important to the reflective learning process, a well-run reflective practi-
cum encourages both. In either case, the reflection that takes place after
the completion of the action, leads to the construction of "a good verbal
74. Id. at 31.
75. Sch6n notes that "reflection-in-action" is quite different in the context of professional prac-
tice than it is in everyday life. See id. at 32-36.
76. Id. at 28.
77. Id. at 35.
78. Id.
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description" 79 of it. This is also important to the reflective learning pro-
cess as a "good verbal description ... may indirectly shape our future
action."8' 0 The next step in the reflective learning process is for the stu-
dent to reflect on her "good verbal description," as a way of refining her
knowledge and becoming more adept at the art of practice. In all, "these
several levels and kinds of reflection play important roles in the acquisi-
tion of artistry."8'
A student cannot be taught the art of lawyering but can be
coached.8 2 Thus, the final key to understanding the reflective learning
practicum is the practitioner-teacher whom Sch6n calls the coach. Out-
standing coaches are those professionals who have learned well the art of
practicing in the "swamp" and who have learned well the "art of coach-
ing," i.e., the art of helping students learn, through reflection, the art of
practice in the "swamp."'8 3 Coaches may teach by traditional means but
mostly "function as coaches whose main activities are demonstrating, ad-
vising, questioning, and criticizing."' 84 In the reflective practicum the
student and coach engage in a dialogue that has three necessary features:
"[I]t takes place in the context of the student's attempts to [perform]; it
makes use of actions as well as words; and it depends upon reciprocal
'reflection-in-action'." 8 5
The coach herself engages in "reflection-in-action" during all her
communications with the student about the various learning techniques
she uses. She may show the student how to perform or tell the student
what to do. She may "demonstrate some part or aspect of the process
[s]he thinks the student needs to learn, offering it as a model to be imi-
tated; and [s]he can, with questions, instructions, advice, or criticism,
describe some feature of [the practice]." '8 6 Whichever techniques she
uses when communicating with a student about the student's perform-
ance, she is always testing her "diagnosis of a student's understanding
and problems and the effectiveness of [her] own strategies of communica-
tion. In this sense, [s]he reflects-in-action.
8 s7
As she seeks to understand the coach's interventions and communi-
79. Id. at 31.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 31. See also Paul Bergman et al., Learning from Experience: Nonlegally-Specific Role
Plays, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 535, 536-39 (1984) (describing a four-stage learning process similar to
Schon's reflective learning).
82. SCH6N, supra note 41, at 17.
83. Id. at 38.
84. Id.




cations by testing her understanding of them through applying them to
further performances, the student engages in "reflection-in-action." In
other words, by using the coach's "reflection-in-action" to solve a profes-
sional problem, the student then "reflects-in-action.
88
"Reflection-in-action" becomes reciprocal when the coach treats the
student's further [performance] as an utterance, a carrier of meanings
like "This is what I take you to mean" or "This is what I really meant
to say," and responds to [the student's] interpretations with further
showing or telling, which the student may [again] decipher ... and
translate into new [performances].89
The process continues throughout the reflective practicum experience,
moving "toward convergence of meaning and toward the student's in-
creasing capacity to produce what she and her coach regard as compe-
tent [performances]. '"90
In the reflective practicum:
[t]he student learns to recognize and appreciate the qualities of good
[professional practice] and competent [professional practice], in the
process by which she also learns to produce those qualities. She learns
the meanings of technical operations in the same process by which she
learns to carry them out. And as she learns [to perform the profes-
sional practice], she also learns to learn [to perform]-that is, she
learns the practice of the practicum.91
C. The Reflective Practicum in Law School: Clinical Legal Education
What does the reflective practicum look like in law schools? Gener-
ally, the practicum takes the form of a live-client clinical legal education
program.92 Clinical education, which appeared on the scene in the late
1960s, starts from the premise that "a major function of law schools is to
give students systematic training in effective techniques for learning law
from the experience of practicing law."'93 Thus, clinical educators under-
stand that their programs must be "designed precisely to teach students
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 102.
91. Id.
92. I refer to live-client clinical education because clinical education is often defined to encom-
pass all experiential learning in which the student assumes a role as a lawyer, including simulation.
See, e.g., SEC. ON CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC., AM. ASS'N OF LAW SCHOOLS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF THE IN-HOUSE CLINIC (1990) [hereinafter IN-HOUSE CLINIC REPORT];
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 234; Gary Bellow, On Teaching The Teachers: Some
Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE
LAW STUDENT 374, 380-86 (1973). For a discussion of live-client versus simulated experiential
learning, see infra part III.D.
93. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 9; Bellow, supra note 92; David Barnhizer, The
Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67 (1979);
Robert J. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice
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how to learn systematically from experience, and simultaneously to edu-
cate them in a broader range of legal analyses and skills than had thereto-
fore been taught in law schools."' 94 In the law school reflective practicum
the students engage in lawyering performances and simultaneously learn
to reflect on the practice in which they engage. That is how they learn to
become reflective practitioners.
Let me describe more concretely how the reflective learning process
might look in a law school in-house clinical setting.95 In the beginning
stages, students know very little about the practice of law. Thus, they
have little tacit knowledge about lawyering to call upon while they en-
gage in their performances. Yet, to solve the professional problems with
which they are presented, they will need to use tacit knowledge because
such problems will contain elements of uncertainty, uniqueness, or value
conflict. 9
6
Since the students have so little relevant tacit knowledge, their
"knowing-in-practice" in seeking solutions to the indeterminacies of their
lawyering problems will most likely be quite sophomoric. Their "reflec-
tion-in-action," if it occurs at all, will happen at a very rudimentary level.
Thus, especially throughout the initial clinical semester, 97 the
clinical professor (as coach) should regularly engage in reflective activity
with the student while the student is working on the lawyering activity
assigned. For example, if the clinical professor has asked the student to
draft a response to a motion for summary judgement, the clinical profes-
sor should confer with the student on a regular basis while the student is
researching and drafting it.98 In the conferences, the clinical professor
may communicate information about, for example, the law of summary
judgment, but she will mostly function as a coach, aiding the student to
solve problems or aspects of problems that lie in the swamp by "demon-
strating, advising, questioning, and criticizing." 99
Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223 (1981); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8; Mark Spiegel, Theory and
Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577 (1987).
94. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 616.
95. See infra part VI.B for a discussion of the difficulty faced by clinical education today in
educating law students to become reflective practitioners.
96. See supra part III.A.
97. Most students do not have the opportunity to take even one clinical course and very few
more than one. It is my view that in order for students to be educated to become reflective practi-
tioners, they need a sequenced clinical curriculum which takes place at least over the last two years
of law school.
98. Students may learn the concepts and theories underlying the skills associated with drafting
a motion for summary judgment as well as the skill of drafting such a motion in their legal writing
courses; however, such courses do not educate students in the art of lawyering. For that students
need live-client clinical education. See infra part III.C-D.
99. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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Several issues will arise that are in the indeterminate zone of prac-
tice and cannot be resolved by simply using traditional knowledge. Why
did the student frame the legal issue the way she did in light of the legal
and factual uncertainties? Did the student simply use the movant's de-
scription of the issue, and is movant's characterization based on a differ-
ent resolution of factual or legal uncertainties than is favorable to the
student's client? How did the student deal with uncertainty concerning
the facts? Can the movant's factual assertions be refuted by the record,
or does the student need to plan and implement a fact-gathering strategy?
What is likely to be this particular client's unique response to a discus-
sion of the weaknesses in her case brought out by movant's motion?
Does the motion demonstrate that our case is tottering on the thin line
between legitimate and frivolous litigation and thus opposing it could
subject the clinical lawyers to sanctions under Rule 11? If the client still
wishes to pursue the litigation, how is this values conflict best discussed
with this client and most appropriately resolved? 1°°
Satisfactory answers to most of the above questions are beyond the
capability of the novice student. However, the clinical professor is exper-
ienced in the art of lawyering, i.e., has acquired that additional knowl-
edge necessary to solve problems in the swamp. Thus, the clinical
professor will use her own knowledge of the practice of law to assist the
student in drafting the response and answering the questions. She will
use her knowledge of problem framing to criticize the student's charac-
terization of the issue. She will use her knowledge of implementation to
explain to the student how to plan a factual investigation. And she will
use her knowledge of handling matters involving value conflict to assist
the student in determining what to do when the situation may present a
conflict between the student's role as zealous advocate for her client's
interests and the student's role as officer of the court.
In completing the assignment the student will use the "knowing-in-
practice" of the clinical professor. By discussing her performance with
the clinical professor while she is working on the assignment, the student
will engage in "reflection-in-action" (albeit using the tacit knowledge of
the clinical professor in so reflecting). The student, then, in a sense will
be engaging in vicarious "reflection-in-action." The student will attempt
to understand the clinical professor's communications by reformulating
100. Students may learn the "skills" associated with resolving these issues through classroom or
simulated education, but learning the "art" requires the uncertainty, uniqueness, and value conflict
of real life situations. See infra part III.C-D.
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the legal issue, by acquiring the necessary facts, and by drafting the
response.
The clinical professor will review the draft of the response, in which
the student will have attempted to incorporate the professor's sugges-
tions. In so doing, the clinical professor will again critique the response
and the student will again seek to understand the criticisms until a draft
is submitted which both the student and clinical professor consider a
competent performance.
Through this process the law student learns to engage in two impor-
tant aspects of the reflective learning process: "knowing-in-practice" and
"reflection-in-action." The student can use what she learns from this
process as acquired tacit knowledge about practice, which will enable her
to engage in more appropriate "knowing-in-practice" and "reflection-in-
action" in subsequent lawyering performances.
After the student completes the assignment, the clinical professor
will expose the student to the later steps of the reflective learning process.
The clinical professor will ask the student to reflect on what she did to
complete the response to the motion for summary judgment and how she
used tacit knowledge to deal with any elements of uncertainty, unique-
ness, or value conflict which arose in the assignment. In other words, the
clinical professor will ask the student to articulate a "good verbal de-
scription" of her lawyering performance, 101 which would include a dis-
cussion of how the student framed the legal issue, what the student did to
resolve the factual uncertainty, and how the student resolved the poten-
tial value conflict raised by the Rule 11 question. It would also include a
discussion of the response itself.
The clinical professor will then ask the student to reflect on that
"good verbal description." o10 2 Here the student might be asked to con-
sider such things as whether the response was sufficiently adversarial,
whether it was legally correct, and whether its style was appropriate.
Was the student satisfied with the way the legal issue was finally framed
in the response? Is the student satisfied with the way that the facts were
acquired? Was the Rule 11 question resolved satisfactorily? It is
through this process that the clinical professor will assist the law student
to learn to engage in these later steps of the reflective learning process.
In the in-house clinical setting, many of the oral lawyering activities
performed by a student, such as a student's performance in court or a
101. The articulation of a "good verbal description" is "reflection on [her] past reflection in
action." See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
102. The reflection on the "good verbal description" is reflecting on the "reflection on past re-
flection in action." See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
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student's interview of a client, will be witnessed by the clinical professor.
If the performance is a written document (such as the response to the
motion for summary judgment), the clinical professor will review the
document before discussing it with the student. Thus, the professor will
know a great deal about the student's performance independent of the
student's reflection or "good verbal description" about it.
The independent knowledge base of the clinical professor will en-
hance the reflective learning process. The clinical professor will use this
base to critique the accuracy of the student's "good verbal description"
of her performance and to critique the performance itself. This in-
dependent knowledge will enable the clinical professor to provide better
critiques of both the student's reflective activity and her performance
than if the clinical professor had relied solely on the student's description
of the performance. 0 3
As a result of the student's reflective learning, the quality of her
future performances in the zone of indeterminacy will improve. First,
the performance will improve because the student has acquired tacit
knowledge for dealing with uncertainty, uniqueness, and value conflict,
i.e., those aspects of lawyering problems situated in the indeterminate
zone. Second, her performance will improve because through reflection
and the assistance of her coach, the student has acquired a method-
reflective learning-which she will use to acquire more knowledge of
the art of lawyering in the future. She is becoming a reflective
practitioner. o4
103. For a discussion of the characteristics of supervision and how it develops throughout the
semester in clinical education programs, see Peter T. Hoffman, The Stages of The Clinical Supervi-
sory Relationship, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 30 (1986); see generally Nina W. Tarr, The Skill of Evaluation as
an Explicit Goal of Clinical Training, 21 PAC. L.J. 967 (1990).
104. But in what kind of clinical settings should the reflective learning take place, in-house clin-
ics or externships? In my view, in-house clinics and externships are essential components of a
clinical program and their respective development should be encouraged. However, since in-house
programs are operated by the law school and the supervisors are full-time members of the faculty,
the in-house clinic can more easily accomplish the educational goals of a reflective learning practi-
cum than can an externship placement. Externship settings are not established primarily to further
the education of the student externs, and the supervisors in the externship settings are practitioners,
not full-time members of a law faculty.
If the students first receive enough reflective learning in the in-house setting to learn the rudi-
ments of the art of lawyering before being sent out to extern, the concerns about externships are
largely abated. See IN-HOUSE CLINIC REPORT, supra note 92, at I-I-1-13 (describing the pedagogi-
cal goals of in-house, live-client clinics). Externships can play a key role in enabling students to
learn the art of practice. They can offer specialized practice experiences which are unavailable in the
typical in-house clinic. In some cases the externship supervisors are master practitioners (and more
adept at lawyering than many current in-house supervisors) who do provide an outstanding educa-
tional experience for their externs. See Janet Motley, Self-Directed Learning and the Out-Of-House
Placement, 19 N.M. L. REV. 211 (1989). Externships give students the opportunity to experience
the real world of practice as opposed to an in-house approximation and still be able to come back to
law school to reflect on and critique that experience.
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D. Clinical Legal Education: Live-Client vs Simulation
There are many in the legal profession who recognize the value of
experiential learning in law school but are not convinced that live-client
learning is necessary. 0 5 In defining the reflective practicum, Sch6n him-
self suggests that students may "learn by undertaking projects that simu-
late and simplify practice; or . . . [by undertaking] real-world
projects."' 0 6 Although simulated learning can play an important supple-
mentary role in teaching lawyers the artistry of practice, simulation can-
not serve as a substitute for experience with real clients. I reach this
conclusion because the goal of reflective-practicum education is to teach
the art of solving lawyering problems in the indeterminate world of prac-
tice-to deal with precisely the kind of authentic messiness and surprise
that inheres in reality, but not in simulation. The best way to do this is in
a practicum that approximates real life as opposed to one that merely
simulates it.
The strengths of simulation over live-client experiential learning are
considered to be uniformity of experience among students, simplification
of difficult problems with an orderly progression to the more complex,
repetition of student performance when necessary, susceptibility to inter-
ruption and videotaping, minimization of harm to real clients with allow-
ance for experimentation, lack of costliness, and a higher student-teacher
ratio. 107
On the other hand, simulation is considered to lack the factual com-
plexity and uncertainty of real cases. Furthermore, students do not be-
come as emotionally involved. Because the emotional investment is less,
the motivation and level of learning decreases as well. Also, real cases
present students with ethical dilemmas in their emotional context. Many
consider this necessary for teaching professional responsibility. To be
truly effectual, simulation is seen to require the same level of supervision,
105. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 81; ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 234.
106. SCHdN, supra note 41, at 37. Although Sch6n states that reflective learning can occur with
simulated or real-life projects, an examination of the practicums he recounts makes it clear that he
recognizes the importance of real-life projects in helping students to become reflective practitioners.
See generally id. In this connection, Schon notes that "[s]tudents learn by practicing the making or
performing at which they seek to become adept, and they are helped to do so by senior practitioners
who.., in Dewey's terms-initiate them into the traditions of practice: 'The customs, methods, and
working standards of the calling constitute a tradition and ... initiation into the tradition is the
means by which the powers of learners are released and directed.' " Id. at 16-17 (citing JOHN
DEWEY ON EDUCATION 151 (R.D. Archmbault ed., 1974)).
107. Peter T. Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
277, 290-91. For a more recent article which discusses the virtues of simulation, see Philip Schrag,
The Serpent Strikes Again: Simulation in a Large First-Year Course, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 555 (1989).
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making it just as expensive as live-client learning. 08
The heightened motivation present in live-client learning has been
discussed from the early days of clinical legal education, as in Alan
Stone's article in which real cases were said to offer students the "oppor-
tunity to explore [a case's] social and psychological implications in as
great a depth as his motivation allows.'' 09
Andrew Watson, writing in the 1960s and 1970s, considered the
emotional component in live-client learning essential in creating a lawy-
ering identity in students that would later enable the students to deal
responsibly with conflicts that would arise in their roles as profession-
als.110 Examples are conflicts between a lawyer's personal desires and
the needs of her clients or between her conflicting obligations, such as
advocate versus officer of the court.1 1  Only when the lawyering identity
of a competent, ethical, and socially responsible practitioner has been
formed in the presence of real conflicts can it be expected to hold up
when the real conflicts in fact occur.
The increased motivation in the live-client situation has also been
suggested to arise from a peculiarity of adult as opposed to child learn-
ing. 1 12 To the extent adults (law students) are self-directed and ready to
acquire a social role, they can benefit from a learning environment which
includes "a spirit of mutuality between teachers and students as joint
inquirers." 113 Believing herself to be a "partner" to the teacher and seek-
ing a solution to a problem together, the student is highly motivated to
learn.1 1 4 But "joint inquiry" requires live-clients. Even an
108. Hoffman, supra note 107, at 291 nn.49-53 (citing several articles and studies as support for
these propositions). See also Michael Meltsner & Philip Schrag, Report From a CLEPR Colony, 76
COLUM L. REv. 581 (1976); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, Here's What We Do: Some Notes
About Clinical Legal Education, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673 (1981). But see Abraham P. Ordover,
Teaching Sensitivity to Facts, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 813, 818-19 (1991) (noting that complex fact
situations can be used in simulated settings).
109. Alan Stone, Legal Education On The Couch, 85 HARV. L. REv. 392, 429-30 (1971) (noting
that "[i]f those who control legal education believe that students should develop human relations
skills in law school, then the legal clinic is the single best vehicle for doing so").
110. Andrew S. Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective On
Legal Education, 8 J. LEGAL REF. 248, 249-52 (1975) [hereinafter Watson, Lawyers and Profession-
alism]; Andrew S. Watson, The Quest For Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93, 103 (1968) [hereinafter Watson, Quest for Professional Compe-
tence] ("One of the critical events which should occur during legal education is the incorporation
into identity of a model for professional behavior."); Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects
of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1963) [hereinafter Watson, Teaching
Professional Responsibility].
111. Watson, Teaching Professional Responsibility, supra note 110, at 1.
112. Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REv.
321, 340 (1982) (citing Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 108, at 626).
113. Id. at 338 (quoting M. KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION 41
(1970)).
114. See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Earl Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern California
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effective, competent simulation must be preplanned so that even if the
instructor participates in the simulation, the law student knows that
there is nothing like shared inquiry or a co-counsel relationship be-
tween student and teacher. In fact, it is likely that the instructor
would not participate at all in the simulation and instead let the stu-
dent work through the problem alone." 5
Because simulation also cannot equal the "factual richness" of the real
case,' 1 6 "epistemological integrity" has been advanced as another reason
to prefer live-client learning to simulation. 17 Nothing but reality has the
complexity of reality, it is argued, and "we cannot be said to truly under-
stand anything until we understand it in context and in complexity.""I18
It has also been noted that students tend to lose interest in their
studies as they progress in law school. In live-client in-house clinics, stu-
dents move from spectator to actor. This change has a profound impact,
in that the personal identification with clients and the assumption of the
lawyering role bring with them a heightened desire to learn. 119
Schon's analysis informs the live-client versus simulation debate in
several ways. Crucial to the reflective practicum is that a student learns
by doing, in a setting designed for teaching the student and with a
teacher who can guide the student through the reflective process. Thus,
the emphasis is on reflective learning as a process, not the substance to be
learned. In this respect, the reflective learning process can be used both
in simulation and live-client experiential learning.
Next we consider what is to be learned. Here we return to Schbn's
topographical metaphor. The "swamp" is where the most important
problems lie, says Sch6n, because only in the swamp, i.e., in the real
world of practice, do we encounter the real emotional conflicts faced by
the learner combined with the indeterminate messiness of the problem
with all its complexities. That is what makes these problems confusing,
Clinical Semester, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 664, 688-89, 694 (1971) (describing the distinctive "two-way
street" of the clinical experience in contrast with traditional legal education).
115. Bloch, supra note 112, at 346.
116. Hoffman, supra note 107, at 291.
117. McDiarmid, supra note 16, at 286 (Despite their high costs, live-client, in-house clinics
provide education which "cannot be replicated by any other teaching methods, [including simulated
education]."). The article analyzes data collected concerning in-house law school clinics from a
1987 survey questionnaire sent by the Clinical Section of the American Association of Law Schools
to member law schools.
118. Id. The article notes that clinics do have a high cost and suggests that one way to lower the
cost is to have many of the subjects that clinics currently teach such as lawyering skills, substantive
law, and law office management be taught in larger classroom settings and to leave the actual live-
client learning in the clinic as a way of lowering costs. Id. at 289. Although these are valuable cost-
saving devices and are educationally sound, I would suggest another way to dramatically lower the
cost of clinical education to the law school is through the fee-generating model we use at Chicago-
Kent. See infra part VII.D.
119. Id. See also Bellow, supra note 92, at 380-86.
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imprecise, and non-rigorous, yet so important. The practitioner who has
not learned to practice in live-client as opposed to simulated settings, has
failed to learn that which Sch6n contends is central to professional prac-
tice. The law student graduates only to find that there is a swamp out
there. If she has been taught only through simulation, not through re-
flective live-client education, she will not have learned the art of practic-
ing in it.
Traditional law school education generally teaches legal doctrine
and legal method. Through live-client clinical education, we can teach
students to be critical about whether to accept the standards of behavior
which exist in their legal communities, and we can assist them in devel-
oping critical decision-making skills. This can be done through students'
role identification which will motivate them to find answers to questions
in the swamp---in other words, to act similarly to the way competent,
ethical, and socially responsible lawyers act in practice. 120
IV. THE NEED FOR LEARNING THE ART OF LAWYERING
IN LAW SCHOOL
What about those who say that even if the art of lawyering is ideally
learned in a law school reflective practicum (live-client, in-house, clinical
education program), the traditional model for learning the art of lawyer-
ing on one's own or through an apprenticeship after law school works
well enough? '
Historically, most law school educators rejected the idea that a law
school education ought to include broad-based instruction in skills and
values and in the art of lawyering. 12' The traditional approach to legal
education essentially borrowed a liberal arts methodology and applied it
to professional education. 22 It assumed that students needed three years
to learn legal method or legal problem solving and to be exposed to a
broad range of legal doctrine. It also assumed that a law school con-
nected to a university ought to teach research-based theory and theoreti-
cal skills and not the practical skills and values associated with trade
120. McDiarmid, supra note 16, at 249.
121. For a detailed discussion of the historical approaches and ideals of legal educators, see E.
Gordon Gee & Donald W. Jackson, Bridging The Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency,
1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695.
122. The Liberal Arts method is based largely on a notion that the focus of the university should
be on research and knowledge for its own sake. The goals of the clinic in the university law school
setting are in apparent conflict and have been the subject of numerous articles. See, e.g., David
Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 130 (1990);
William Pincus, The Clinical Component in University Professional Education, 32 OHIO ST. L. J. 283
(1971).
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schools. And finally, it assumed that once students learned to "think like
lawyers" they would learn the fundamental skills and values as well as
the art of practice after they graduated.
Students took a wide variety of courses designed to help them think
like lawyers and learn legal doctrine. This approach offered students a
broad knowledge of the law with strong emphasis on analysis. It worked
reasonably well for students who in their early years of practice received
their training from highly competent, ethical, and socially responsible
practitioners. It did not work as well for the majority of students, who
were not trained by such practitioners. Those new lawyers often opened
their own offices or worked in relatively unsupervised or poorly super-
vised work environments.
For students who learned the art of lawyering in unsupervised set-
tings, it has been difficult to learn to practice law in a highly competent
manner or to learn how best to apply the ethical and social obligations of
lawyers in their practices. If these new lawyers had primary responsibil-
ity for representation of clients during the early years of their practices,
many of those clients may not have been adequately served.
Too many settings in which young lawyers have been employed are
"apprenticeships" in name only. In fact, the young associate's supervisor
has provided little or no supervision and the young lawyer essentially has
learned the art of lawyering on her own. Further, in many apprentice-
ships the supervisor has not herself performed with sufficient compe-
tency, ethics, or social responsibility. In those settings, the young
lawyers have not learned to practice law in a highly competent manner
or with high ethical or socially responsible values.
Sometimes a highly competent lawyer has been willing to provide
young associates with a well-supervised apprenticeship, but has not been
a good model of professional ethics or social responsibility. And finally,
even in those (relatively few) settings in which the young associates have
been closely guided and have learned the art of lawyering in a highly
competent, ethical, and socially responsible environment, they may not
have been exposed to new practice techniques or to new ways of consid-
ering questions of values or social responsibility. 123
123. For example, a significant number of very competent lawyers are not familiar, I suspect,
with the newest theories of interviewing and counseling such as those found in BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS As COUNSELORS, supra note 8, generally considered a significant advance by clinical
professors. If law students were to learn to apply these relatively new techniques of interviewing and
counseling in a law school reflective practicum, they would take this knowledge with them to their
first job after graduation. By so doing, knowledge of the theory would spread more quickly than
would be the case if the theory is disseminated only by articles and continuing legal education
programs.
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I would like to put in perspective my comments concerning the diffi-
culty most lawyers have in learning a desirable model of practice after
graduating from law school. I do not mean to imply that the majority of
lawyers (or even a high percentage) practice incompetently, or unethi-
cally, or with a lack of social concern. Large numbers of lawyers have
learned to practice well in all respects in spite of the lack of supervision
and poor apprenticeship training available to them. Also, lawyers and
the legal profession have been at the forefront of social reform in this
country, from their support of affirmative action programs, to legal aid
for the poor, environmental concerns, and human rights in the interna-
tional arena. We can be proud of the many courageous stands taken by
segments of the organized bar with regard to many of the social issues of
our time.
Nevertheless, there are serious problems in the legal profession to-
day. To illustrate their depth and breadth, I pose the following ques-
tions: Are we satisfied with the overall quality of the practice of law?
With the ethics of lawyers? With the role of lawyers and the legal profes-
sion in seeking solutions to poverty and other social problems which con-
front society today? With the quality of judicial decision making? With
the operation of legal institutions? With the legal profession as a whole?
Are we content with the contributions our graduates are making to im-
prove the level of practice in these areas? I say "no" to each question. 124
Among the practicing bar, there is too much incompetence, a wide-
spread lack of professionalism, and not enough of a sense of social obliga-
tion. For most people, obtaining justice is too expensive and thus
depends on the litigant's resources and choice of lawyer, rather than the
legitimacy of the cause. For many, any legal assistance is simply beyond
their economic reach. Basic institutions of society with which lawyers
are intimately connected, such as the criminal justice system and the wel-
fare rights system, are dysfunctional.
Why aren't lawyers doing better at all of this? And what does pro-
fessional education have to do it? Obviously solutions to the above
problems present profound questions, most of which are beyond the
124. I am not alone in my dissatisfaction. See, e.g., Warren Burger, The Role of the Law Schools
in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 361 (1981);
Robert L. Clare, Jr., Incompetency and the Responsibility of Courts and Law Schools, 50 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 463 (1976); Lawrence A. Dubin, Professionalism Among Lawyers The Law School's Role,
68 MICH. B.J. 850 (1989); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 63-74 (1992); Steven Hartwell, Moral Development,
Ethical Conduct, and Clinical Education, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 131 (1990); Sandra D. O'Connor,
Legal Education and Responsibility, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 659 (1985); Gregory A. Sobkowski, Pro-
fessionalism Among Lawyers: The Law School's Role (Part 2), 33 REs GESTAE 441 (1980).
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scope of this paper. Certainly improved education alone cannot provide
complete solutions to our deep societal problems. But I am convinced
that reforming legal education to include programs such as the new dis-
pute resolution program, can play an important role in helping lawyers
and the legal profession do better. If not, we as legal educators ought to
pack up and go home.
According to Schon, professional inadequacy, as I have described it
in the world of law, exists in all professions today. Why should society
continue "to grant [the professions] extraordinary rights and privi-
leges"125 if they cannot deal effectively with the societal problems they
are supposed to solve? Sch6n notes that "[tihe crisis of confidence in
professional knowledge corresponds to a similar crisis in professional ed-
ucation. If professions are blamed for ineffectiveness and impropriety,
their schools are blamed for failing to teach the rudiments of effective
and ethical practice."
1 26
To teach such rudiments, law schools ought not teach the students
only "research-based theory and technique." Students must also learn
the art of lawyering in order to educate them to solve problems which do
not easily lend themselves to rigorous inquiry because they are in the
"indeterminate zone of practice," i.e., they involve uncertainty, unique-
ness, or value conflict.
Why is it so important to provide this type of education in law
school? Not simply because a reflective practicum is a better way to
learn the art of lawyering than learning it on one's own or through an
apprenticeship after graduation. 27 Rather, it is because too many law-
yers are not learning to practice with sufficient competence, ethics, and
social responsibility. And it is because more lawyers will practice with
higher standards if they receive sufficient education in the art of lawyer-
ing while in law school.
Law school offers a unique opportunity to teach the art of lawyering
through the reflective learning process. The clinical educators from
whom the students learn are full-time members of a law school faculty
and thus are expected, unlike lawyers in practice, to engage the students
in the reflective learning process. They have hopefully been selected for
high standards of competence, ethics, and social responsibility. 128
Moreover, law school is the time when a student's professional iden-
125. SCHON, supra note 41, at 7.
126. Id. at 8.
127. See supra part III.B-C.
128. See infra part VII.D for a discussion of the Chicago-Kent fee generating model as one way
in which employing clinical educators with high standards can be accomplished.
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tity is shaped. 129 Law students do acquire a lawyering identity while
they are in law school even under the current model of legal education.
The problem, however, is that the lawyering identity they acquire is inad-
equate because legal education focuses primarily on the intellectual or
analytic aspect of lawyering, which though important, is only one facet
of what lawyers need to know.
First, it is inadequate because the current model of legal education
discounts the importance of the emotional aspects of lawyering. Thus,
the students acquire a lawyering identity which suggests that the practice
of law is not concerned with emotional conflict.130 Yet, in practice, law-
yers encounter a great deal of emotional conflict, e.g., between their own
interests and the interest of the client; between their obligation to zeal-
ously represent their client and their obligation as officers of the court.
Second, it is inadequate because the current model of legal educa-
tion does not teach them all the fundamental lawyering skills and values
and does not educate them in the art of lawyering. Thus, the lawyering
identity they form in law school does not embody that knowledge essen-
tial for the practice of law.
If the law schools teach the art of lawyering, 131 the student's profes-
129. See articles cited supra note 110.
130. As one author noted, educating the student to "think like a lawyer" without considering the
emotional content of lawyering can too easily result in the student learning to feel like a lawyer who
is "controlling, cool, dispassionate, unfeeling [and] arrogant." Michael Meltnser, Feeling Like a
Lawyer, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 624, 624 (1983).
131. Here I again part company with the ABA Task Force Report. Although it increases our
understanding of the fundamental lawyering skills and values and gives us insights into the process
by which law students are educated to become responsible practitioners, it does not recommend that
law students be required to receive live-client clinical education in law school. The Report does note
the importance of live-client clinical education which it considers of limited value because it "would
rarely be able to duplicate the pressures and intensity of a practice setting." ABA Task Force Re-
port, supra note 1, at 234.
Why does the ABA Task Force Report so delimit clinical education? The Report fails to recog-
nize what this paper seeks to demonstrate, that the professional knowledge used by lawyers to solve
problems in the "swamp," includes-in addition to legal doctrine, skills and values-a separate body
of knowledge, the "art of lawyering." Since the SSV considers "problem solving" merely a skill, not
both a "skill" and an "art," see supra note 21, it does not see the need to teach it though live-client
rather than simulated education. As I have noted, supra text accompanying notes 59-60, the art of
lawyering is equivalent to what may be described as the "art of problem solving." I have no problem
with the Report's recommendation that law students receive their skills training in either simulated
or live-client experiences, because I agree that the Report calls "the concepts and theories underlying
the skills and values" can be taught through classroom and simulated education. ABA Task Force
Report, supra note 1, at 331. However, the Report does not recognize what I have concluded is
essential, Le., that students learn the art of lawyering while in law school and that the "art" of
problem solving which is the art of lawyering must be learned in reflective, live-client clinical educa-
tion programs.
As to the Report's view that live-client clinical education cannot duplicate important aspects of
practice, I would refer the reader to the attempt being made to approximate more closely a real
practice setting at the Chicago-Kent Law Offices. See infra part VII.D.
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sional identity will include a model for practicing in the swamp, i.e., for
dealing with uncertainty, uniqueness, and value conflict. The emerging
lawyer will have at her professional core a body of knowledge arguably
more important than any other, because it will enable her to apply legal
doctrine, skills, and values in practice. She will have internalized knowl-
edge with which to deal with emotional conflict, once thought and taught
to lie outside the realm of legal education and practice. In addition, the
student will have internalized a method-the reflective learning pro-
cess-that will remain with her throughout her professional life.
The power of a professional identity to affect future practice should
not be underestimated, for once a professional identity is formed, the
lawyer will most likely pattern her professional behavior on the model
she has internalized, rather than a less desirable model to which she may
be exposed in the real world of practice.1 32 If students acquire a lawyer-
ing identity with high standards while in law school, then a greater
number of lawyers will be competent, ethical, and socially responsible
practitioners. Thus, reforming legal education in this way will most
likely improve the quality of lawyering and the legal profession.
It is the obligation of the law schools to seize the opportunity they
have to reform the profession, something that some legal educators have
long understood:
Professional skill can be gained only through direct guided experience
with one who is already practicing in the image of this desired goal.
The tensions affecting professional behavior demand the ultimate of
psychological maturity, and this skill, like any other, is the product of
learning and experience. Just as no human being could in a lifetime
develop all of the intellectual content of the law, so he cannot retrace
the intricate steps of developing professional images on his own. The
distillate of centuries of slow and painful learning must be transmitted
in the first instance by someone who knows it. Then and only then
may the elements of professionalism be tailored and modulated to fit
the individuality and the personal skills of the practitioner. This
should be the focus of intensive assistance at the academic level. It
must not be entrusted to chance or to the casual teaching which comes
from practitioners whose major interest lies elsewhere. I do not mean to
depreciate the concern of the practice bar; indeed, I trust that I have
made it obvious that their assistance is valuable and that they have
much more to contribute than they have ever been asked to provide.
But I do believe that this concern must be focused by those who devote
their life primarily to teaching the overall range of concerns.
133
132. See Watson, Quest for Professional Competence, supra note 110, at 103; Watson, Teaching
Professional Responsibility, supra note 110, at 3-5.
133. Andrew S. Watson, On the Low Status of the Criminal Bar: Psychological Contributions of
the Law School, 43 TEx. L. REV. 289, 309-10 (1965) (emphasis added).
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This point was strongly made again in a later article:
Because law students do not habitually conceptualize their future roles
as lawyer-professionals, those who teach them how to behave as law-
yers become extremely important in the ultimate shaping process. It
thus borders on irresponsibility to leave the professionalizing process
to the random adventitious experiences of post-law school encounters.
It is critical then that legal educators avoid reinforcement of inappro-
priate lawyer behavior and avidly grasp every opportunity to reinforce
positively those behaviors which are vital to effective and appropriate
professional practice. 134
V. LAW SCHOOL EDUCATION: THE PRESENT
Admittedly, legal education looks quite different today than it did
25 years ago at most American law schools. Today all law schools re-
quire legal writing in the first year. They offer trial advocacy programs,
and in-house or externship clinical education programs are electives in
virtually every law school in the country. In addition, law schools offer
courses that cover most of the fundamental lawyering skills discussed in
the SSV and ABA accreditation standards require every law school to
provide instruction in professional responsibility to all students.
35
Probably the most important catalyst for change in law school edu-
cation was the introduction of clinical education into the law school
world in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1967, a time of increasing
social unrest and a heightened national consciousness about poverty, the
Ford Foundation created and funded the Council On Legal Education
for Professional Responsibility ("CLEPR") for the purpose of establish-
ing legal clinics in law schools to provide legal assistance to those who
could not afford it. 136 Although there were law schools with legal clinics
prior to 1968, a large number of law school clinics were created nearly
overnight because of grants received from CLEPR.
134. Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 110, at 250.
135. At Chicago-Kent College of Law, the changes in the curriculum in the past 25 years have
also been extensive. In addition to a traditional curriculum, we now offer six clinical education
programs which enroll about 250 students each year and simulated skills courses in such diverse
areas as trial practice, which is taken by almost every student in the school, interviewing and coun-
seling, negotiation, and alternative dispute resolution. Legal writing is required during the entire
three years of the curriculum. And we teach a variety of computer competencies. A course on
Justice is a first year required course, and in selected upper-level courses we pay attention to ways in
which the insights of other fields might positively impact on the solution to legal problems. We have
added a range of doctrinal courses to respond to the evolution of society in such areas as interna-
tional and environmental law. In the environmental law field we have established an interdiscipli-
nary concentration which considers the insights of the related fields of philosophy, economics,
history, and engineering.
136. George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC.
173-74 (1974); see also David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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Clinical education was an entirely new method of education that
moved law school learning out of the classroom and into the world of
practice. Pedagogically, its salient features were subsequently described
as:
students are confronted with problem situations of the sort that law-
yers confront in practice; the students deal with the problem in role;
the students are required to interact with others in attempts to identify
and solve the problems; and, perhaps most critically, the student per-
formance is subjected to intensive critical review.
137
When first introduced, the clinical method was employed primarily to
teach students a variety of lawyering skills previously ignored by the law
schools, such as interviewing, counseling, negotiation, pretrial litigation
including drafting pleadings and conducting discovery, and trial skills.
Most of the early programs in clinical education dealt with problems of
poverty and thus involved the law schools in performing services for the
poor as well as addressing the issue of how problems of the poor could
best be solved. 138 Since traditional law school education did not teach
law students about the problems of poverty, clinical education by its very
existence challenged the validity of both the methodology and the con-
tent of the traditional curriculum.
In addition, in a very short period of time the clinical education
movement brought into the law schools a large number of teachers whose
role and expertise was quite different from that of the traditional teach-
ers. Clinical teachers for the most part were politically to the left and
some were political activists. Neither they nor their clinical work was
considered quite appropriate for the academy, because the clinical profes-
sors were not scholars and their work was too practice (and perhaps too
poverty law) oriented. Also, for the most part clinical faculty were
funded by "soft money" and were not given faculty status. All of this
made for quite a volatile mix.
137. IN-HOUSE CLINIC REPORT, supra note 92, at I-1. The first modem definition of clinical
legal education is found in Bellow, supra note 92, at 379, where the clinical education teaching
method is said to have "three main features: 1) the student's assumption and performance of a
recognized role within the legal system; 2) the teacher's reliance on this experience as the focal point
for intellectual inquiry and speculation; and 3) a number of identifiable tensions which arise out of
ordering the teaching-learning process in this way." See also Robert J. Condlin, The Moral Failure
of Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS
317-18 (David Luban ed., 1984) (defining clinical education "as instruction in interpersonal skills...
and professional ethics... in the context of fieldwork... (... with live cases in law offices created by
law schools for this purpose) under the supervision ... of a law teacher"); David R. Barnhizer, The
Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67 (1979).
138. In those earliest days, clinical education generally assumed a live-client setting. CLEPR,




Because the clinical faculty and their programs were marginalized
by the law schools, clinicians were forced to justify themselves. They did
so by examining the pedagogical validity of their work. In addition to
critiquing their own programs, they compared clinical methodology to
traditional education and began a reexamination of what professional ed-
ucation ought to be. Thus, a process was begun in which the entire edu-
cational program of the law school was put under a microscope. This
has resulted in a number of thoughtful studies by the American Bar As-
sociation and the American Association of Law Schools as well as impor-
tant scholarship by both clinical and traditional faculty on the question
of how sound professional education ought to look.1 39 In recent years,
traditional legal education and traditional scholarship, as well as clinical
education, have been critiqued by such movements as law and econom-
ics, critical legal studies, and law and feminism.' 40 The studies and the
critiques have served as stimuli for change.
VI. LAW SCHOOL EDUCATION: WHY WE HAVE NOT
YET SUCCEEDED
Although the changes in the law school curriculum in the past
twenty-five years represent positive developments, there remain serious
problems in the legal profession and in legal education calling for even
more far-reaching educational reform.
Legal education to date has not yet adequately educated most law
students to become reflective practitioners. There are a number of rea-
sons for this, which can be fairly summarized by stating that the current
state of both skills and values education and clinical education are still
lacking. 14'
139. Eg., HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCA-
TION (1972); ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1; Clinical Legal Education, 1980 ASS'N AM. L.
SCH.-A.B.A. COMM. ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC.; Barnhizer, supra note 137;
Kreiling, supra note 68; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8.
140. See, e.g., Elson, supra note 1 (critiquing legal scholarship in general); Phyllis Goldfarb, A
Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599
(1991) (critiquing legal education from a feminism perspective); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education
as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 1982) (critiquing the ideo-
logical content of the law school curriculum from a Critical Legal Studies perspective); Robert H.
Lande, A Law & Economics Perspective on a "Traditional" Torts Case: Insights for Classroom and
Courtroom, 57 Mo. L. REv. 399 (1992) (proposing a means of learning from a law & economics
perspective).
141. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1; Garth & Martin, supra note 8.
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A. What Is Wrong with the Current State of Skills
and Values Education
Notwithstanding the substantial increase in skills and values train-
ing in law schools in the past twenty-five years, while they are in law
school the majority of law students are not educated in most of the fun-
damental skills mentioned in the SSV. Though course offerings cover
most of the SSV's skills, most law students take no more than one or two
skills courses while in law school, in addition to legal writing and trial
advocacy. 142
Empirical studies asking lawyers about their skills training in law
school have concluded that law schools do not provide most students
with sufficient education in a number of the skills which are crucial to the
practice of law.143 One recent study noted that law school graduates re-
ported a significant gap between the skills they believed could be taught
and the skills they were actually taught in law schools. 144 This gap in-
cluded the two skills which they deemed the most important, oral and
written communication, as well as all of the other practical skills such as
drafting of legal documents, diagnosing and planning solutions for legal
problems, negotiation, fact gathering, and counseling. 145 Moreover,
most lawyers wished that they had received more skills training in law
school. 46
Education in professional values has amounted mostly to the ABA
mandated course in the Code of Professional Responsibility which is not
sufficient education in the fundamental values we expect lawyers to use in
the practice of law. 147 If the goal of values education is to change behav-
ior, learning must include live-client experiential as well as doctrinal
learning. Examples of values which are not taught by most law schools,
and as far as I know are not required by any, include the lawyer's obliga-
tion to society, strategies for reducing the cost of the delivery of legal
services, or the effectiveness of legal institutions such as the juvenile or
criminal justice systems.
B. What Is Wrong with the Current State of Clinical Education
Clinical education has made great strides in its twenty-five-year his-
142. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 233-60.
143. ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 8; ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1; Garth &
Martin, supra note 8; McDiamid, supra note 16.
144. Garth & Martin, supra note 8, at 13 (Table 4 and accompanying text).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 31.
147. Watson, Teaching Professional Responsibility, supra note 110, at 20-21.
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tory. It exists in virtually every fully-accredited school in the country.
Many of the programs, in-house clinics and externships, are well run
with sound educational goals. They make herculean efforts to provide
their students with a solid education in the practice of law. A significant
number of clinical professors are well respected and accepted as peers by
the academy. Yet, there persist important problems with the current
state of clinical education.
First, too many students receive no in-house clinical education while
in law school. A recent study reported that "[a] live-client clinical expe-
rience taught by the faculty of a law school is available on average to
only 30% of law students in the schools which offer such courses.' 48
Even a law school like my own, which has a large clinical program com-
pared to most, has been able to offer only a small number of in-house
clinical credits to less than 50% of the class.
Second, a significant amount of clinical education is necessary to
educate students to become reflective practitioners, and law schools sim-
ply do not provide enough. Schdn argues that the reflective practicum
"demands . . . duration far beyond the normal requirements of a
course."1 49 One can only speculate about how much is enough, but in
my judgment students should receive at least one year's worth of credits
(out of the current three-year J.D. program) in clinical education and
related skills and values instruction.
Sequenced learning cannot occur in the current world of clinical ed-
ucation because there are too few courses in clinical education programs
to permit the development of a progression of clinical courses. One way
to structure a sequenced clinical curriculum could be to require students
to enroll in an in-house clinic in their second year and then in an extern-
ship in their third year of law school. The externship placement could
build on the student's second year in-house experience, and the class-
room components of each clinical course could do likewise.
Third, clinical professors are often hired with limited amounts of
practical experience. Most have not worked in traditional law offices and
therefore have not been exposed to the practice of law in settings in
which most law graduates will eventually find themselves. Many schools
require their clinical professors to do too much. Clinicians are often re-
quired to supervise a full compliment of in-house students, the most la-
bor intensive of all teaching assignments, and at the same time supervise
148. McDiarmid, supra note 16, at 246.
149. SCHON, supra note 41, at 311.
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an externship program, teach a traditional course, perform administra-
tive work, and engage in scholarship.
To the extent clinical professors are not scholars, they have been
treated like second class citizens. They are typically paid less than tradi-
tional professors at the same law school.150 They frequently have low
faculty status and limited job security. 151 Not surprisingly, there is a
fairly high turnover. Some leave clinical teaching to become traditional
teachers and others go into private practice. The result of all this is that
students are often taught by fairly inexperienced practitioners who are
also inexperienced teachers and who have inadequate time to teach re-
flective learning.
Fourth, most clinical programs do not sufficiently resemble the real
world of practice. I recognize that clinical programs must temper the
harsh reality of practice by enabling students to perform at low risk and
allowing time for inefficiency, repetition, and reflection. "A practicum
may fail because its striving for realism overloads students with practical
constraints [just as it might fail] because it leaves out too many important
features of real-world practice." 152 But it is this latter concern that is the
more serious problem faced by in-house clinical programs today. Most
in-house clinical programs are not set up like law firms. They are often
funded with short term government grants and modelled after small legal
aid offices which handle large numbers of small individual cases. In such
programs, cases are not selected with sound economic decision making in
mind. Students are not taught to be efficient. They do not keep time
sheets. Decisions on how to handle cases and whether to settle are not
necessarily made by considering the economic value of the case in the
same way as decisions are in private practice. Students are not taught
the mechanics of fee-generating practice and are not exposed to impor-
tant ethical problems which arise only in fee practices.
Fifth, in these settings students usually handle the entire case them-
selves with the clinical supervisor acting only as supervisor and not as
lawyer. Students may only be exposed to small routine cases (as they are
incapable of handling more sophisticated cases on their own) and do not
150. Roy T. Stuckey, a professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law, in his
official capacity as a member of the Council of the ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar has reviewed data taken from the Annual ABA Questionnaire on Law Professors' Salaries
over a number of years. From that data, he has observed that clinical professors are typically paid
less than traditional professors at the same law school. Telephone conversation with Roy T. Stuckey
(Feb. 9, 1993).
151. Results of Surveys and Questionnaires Regarding the Status of Professional Skills Teachers
1984-1991, Memorandum C9192-67 by Roy T. Stuckey to Council of the ABA Section on Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar (Jan. 19, 1992).
152. SCH 5N, supra note 41, at 170.
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learn from observing their supervisors as role models. These are serious
educational limitations because non-routine cases (or at least a mix of
routine and complex cases) offer richer learning experiences for under-
standing the art of lawyering, and modelling (in addition to performing)
is and has always been a key way lawyers have learned to practice.
153
Sixth, there are problems associated with externships, which are a
prevalent form of clinical education today largely because they are less
expensive than in-house programs. Too many externship programs are
not well supervised by the law schools, and the students do not subject
their lawyering experiences to the reflective learning process. Externship
supervisors are often selected without careful screening and without the
law schools explicitly informing the externship supervisors of the particu-
lar goals of the program. There is often very little interaction between
the supervisor and the law school or between the student and the law
school during the externship period.
154
A law school's clinical education program is the reflective practicum
in which the students should learn the art of lawyering. But for the
clinical education program to educate the students to become reflective
practitioners, it must have certain attributes. It must provide the stu-
dents with enough clinical education, provide teachers who are master
practitioners and master educators, and provide an environment which
closely resembles real practice while engaging students in the reflective
learning process. Only then will clinical programs educate students to
become highly competent, ethical, and socially responsible practitioners.
VII. THE FUTURE-THE NEW DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM
A. Introduction
The new dispute resolution program will make a serious effort to
educate law students adequately for the practice of law. It will do this by
supplying the students with a sufficient amount of traditional education
in legal doctrine and legal method and the other fundamental lawyering
skills and values, as well as enough clinical education to enable them to
become reflective practitioners. By providing the students with a com-
prehensive professional education, we expect them to acquire a lawyering
identity which incorporates high standards of competence, ethics, and
social responsibility.
153. See Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. REV.
188 (1990).
154. For further thoughts about externships, see supra note 104.
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B. Traditional Legal Education
By broadening the curriculum to require sufficient education in the
fundamental lawyering skills and values and in clinical education
courses, will we take away too many credits from the traditional curricu-
lum? Historically, the goals of traditional legal education have been to
educate students in the legal doctrine of the basic law (usually in courses
which are offered in the first year of law school) such as torts, contracts,
property, criminal law, civil procedure, and constitutional law; legal
method including legal problem solving, appellate case analysis, and stat-
utory analysis; legal research and writing; and some advanced or special-
ized legal doctrine. Thus, the question is, how many credits are
necessary to provide a sound education in these areas?
In the new dispute resolution program, of the 90 credits required for
graduation, students will take a minimum of 53 credits in traditional
courses. 155 They will be required to take a minimum of 25 credits from
the clinical and other non-traditional courses. The remaining 12 credits
may be taken from the traditional or non-traditional curriculum.
The first-year curriculum will be virtually identical to the first-year
curriculum for the remainder of the student body, except for an addi-
tional non-credit requirement which will expose students in the program
to dispute resolution practice. Thus, to the extent that basic legal doc-
trine, legal method, and legal research and writing156 are taught in the
first year of law school, students in the new dispute resolution program
will receive the same education as will other students.
During their second and third years, students will take approxi-
mately one additional year of traditional law school credits. Since basic
legal doctrine, legal method, and legal research and writing are usually
learned by the students in their first year or year and one-half of law
school, the new dispute resolution program should provide adequate edu-
cation in this regard. If so, the remaining legitimate question is: Does
the new program offer enough doctrinal training in upper level courses to
expose students to a sufficient amount of advanced and specialized legal
doctrine?
The short answer is yes. To solve the crises in the legal profession,
155. It should be noted that Chicago-Kent law students who are not in the program must com-
plete only 84 credits for graduation. Thus, students in the new dispute resolution program must take
an additional six credits. Upon completion of the program, the students will receive a J.D. and a
certificate for completing the dispute resolution program.
156. At Chicago-Kent, all students are already required to take legal writing courses in all three
years of law school. See George D. Gopen, The State Of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86
MICH. L. REV. 333, 357-58 (1987).
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i.e., the acknowledged lack of competency, ethics, and social responsibil-
ity in law practice today, law students must be educated to become reflec-
tive practitioners and to acquire a lawyering identity while in law school
which incorporates high standards of competence, ethics, and social re-
sponsibility. Since law school remains a three-year program, the number
of credits devoted to traditional legal education courses must be reduced
to make credits available to fulfill these expanded educational objectives.
If this means less exposure to advanced or specialized legal doctrine, so
be it.
Even with the new dispute resolution program, the students will
take some courses in advanced or specialized legal doctrine. They should
be able to learn whatever additional legal doctrine they need after they
graduate, while working on particular legal problems in their law prac-
tices or through continuing legal education programs. Of all the bodies
of knowledge that lawyers need to acquire, advanced or specialized legal
doctrine is probably the most accessible after law school. 157
Moreover, I am not sure that we are giving up as much legal doc-
trine as one thinks simply because 53 to 65 credits instead of 84 credits
will be allocated to traditional course work in the new program. Of the
25 to 37 credits devoted to non-traditional courses, a minimum of 18
credits will be in clinical education courses. In virtually all clinical edu-
cation courses, students learn some legal doctrine through their practice.
In a number of clinical programs and especially in those in which the
caseload focuses on a single subject matter, the classroom component of
the clinical course also teaches some legal doctrine. Such is the case in
the classroom components of all three of our in-house clinical programs.
We teach some substantive law of employment discrimination in the civil
division, we teach some criminal procedure law in the criminal division
program, and we teach a two-credit course in tax procedure in the tax
division.
As law schools come to recognize the need to broaden the law
school curriculum to include education in skills, values, and the art of
lawyering, they can experiment with more efficient ways to teach legal
doctrine. If we conclude that the students should receive more instruc-
tion in advanced or specialized legal doctrine than is possible with the
new dispute resolution curriculum as presently constituted, I would rec-
ommend adding to the curriculum several upper-level doctrinal courses
taught primarily by the lecture method. These courses could teach the
157. Continuing legal education courses have always stressed legal doctrine, both on the national
and local levels.
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basic legal doctrine of several related areas of law. We ought to think
creatively about this. We might decide that students need to learn the
equivalent of only one hour of credit in each advanced subject rather
than two or three or four. Thus, we could devote, say, one three-credit
course in each semester in the third year to this survey approach and by
so doing, teach the students up to six additional doctrinal subjects.
C. Education in Skills and Values
In the new dispute resolution program, we have allocated enough
credits to skills and values education for the students to be educated in
all the fundamental skills and values described in the SSV, plus those
additional skills and values we consider necessary for the practice of
law. 158 To accomplish our goal, the new dispute resolution program will
include a number of non-clinical courses in skills training: Legal Writing
I, a three-credit course; Legal Writing II, a two-credit course; Pre-trial
Litigation, a two-credit course; Trial Advocacy I, a three-credit course;
Alternative Dispute Resolution II, a three-credit course; and a third-year
writing Seminar, a two-credit course. In addition, students may take
other skills courses in fulfillment of their twelve credits of electives and
distributional requirements, and skills training will be included in the
classroom components of the clinical courses.
The program will provide a broad values education by allocating
eight credits to the following courses: Justice, three credits; Professional
Responsibility, two credits; and Perspectives, three credits. In addition,
students may take other values courses as part of the twelve credits of
electives and distributional requirements, and values training will be in-
cluded in the classroom components of the clinical courses as well as in
the special programs which will be offered to the students in the new
dispute resolution program during their first year of law school.
D. Clinical Education
Finally, the new dispute resolution program will require the stu-
dents to take a minimum of four clinical legal education courses, one
course in each semester of their second and third years, for a total of 18
credit hours. Three of the required clinical courses will be taught in the
in-house setting, and one will be taught as an externship placement. The
clinical education sequence will be the vehicle through which the stu-
dents will learn the art of lawyering because they will apply the relevant
158. See supra part II.
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legal doctrine, skills, and values to solve legal problems in the indetermi-
nate world of practice. The clinical education sequence will educate
through the reflective learning process, which will enable students to be-
come reflective practitioners. Its goal is to turn out lawyers who have
acquired in law school a lawyering identity of a highly competent, ethi-
cal, and socially responsible practitioner.
Is there enough clinical education and is it of sufficient quality to do
the job? How much is enough? The clinical education curriculum must
provide the students with a broad range of practical experiences to which
the reflective learning process can be applied. Students should interview
and counsel clients, engage in various types of discovery, draft pleadings
and other documents, engage in legal research, write briefs, participate in
court and alternative dispute resolution proceedings, plan the litigation,
and participate in important decisions regarding their cases. Each signif-
icant lawyering performance should be subjected to the reflective learn-
ing process described by Sch6n.1 59
Because the new program allocates 18 credits in four separate
courses to clinical education, the clinical education sequence will give
sufficient time to expose the students to enough areas of live-client prac-
tice and enough reflective learning to enable them to become reflective
practitioners. But learning to be a reflective practitioner, though a neces-
sary condition for a wise and moral practice, is not a sufficient one. 160
Thus, a critical inquiry is: Does the clinical education in the new dispute
resolution program enable the students to develop the quality of lawyer-
ing identity we have set out to achieve?
To accomplish this, the standards which must be met by the clinical
education courses are: 1) outstanding clinical professors who have mas-
159. See supra part II.B-C. Let me briefly describe three examples of how the clinical supervi-
sors currently use reflective practicum education in the Chicago-Kent clinical education program:
1. The supervisor's conference in the in-house clinical programs. This is the most widely used
reflective learning device in the law school world today. The student and clinical professor maintain
continuous dialogue regarding their lawyering while working together on real cases. In this way, the
students' work is critiqued by the clinical professor and the students are simultaneously encouraged
to reflect on their lawyering experiences.
2. The classroom component of the Judicial Externship program. Here we use the classroom
component to encourage students to reflect on the nature of the externship work in which they are
engaged. In one class we use Herman Melville's Billy Budd and ask the students to analyze the
profound questions of justice in the book and to use them to reflect on their experiences in assisting
judicial decision makers.
3. The classroom component for returning students in the Advanced Externship program.
Here we assign readings on the nature of the adversary system and require each student to prepare a
paper in which he or she reflects on the impact of the adversary system on the practice goals of the
office in which they extern. Each student orally presents his or her paper and the class reflects on the
presentation.
160. SCH6N, supra note 41, at xiii.
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tered the art of lawyering and the art of clinical teaching; 2) an environ-
ment which closely resembles a real practice setting and allows for
sufficient reflective learning; and 3) sequenced clinical learning, including
externships, in which education in the advanced courses builds on what
is taught in earlier skills and values courses and the earlier clinical educa-
tion courses.
At Chicago-Kent, we have sought to deal with the problems faced
by clinical programs, both in terms of quantity and quality, by introduc-
ing a feature unique, so far as we know, to any in-house clinical program.
We have a fee-generating practice in which the salaries of the in-house
clinical professors are linked to the fees they generate.' 6 1 Our fee-gener-
ating practice with its link to the salaries is key to creating a program
which can accomplish our educational goals. Although a detailed analy-
sis of our fee-generating model of clinical education is beyond the scope
of this paper, I will summarize the features of the program which are
relevant here.
Each in-house clinical professor whose salary is linked to fees is ex-
pected to generate fees equal to her salary. 162 The Law School funds the
clinical professor's operating expenses and fringe benefits. If the clinical
professor generates fees in excess of her salary in a given year, she re-
ceives a bonus. 63 Linking the clinical professor's salary to her fees and
permitting her to earn a bonus is important to the success of our model,
as it enables the law school to pay successful clinical professors much
higher salaries than are usually earned by clinical professors. Also, the
cost to the law school is far less than if the salary of the clinical professor
were paid for with law school funds.
As Sch6n emphasized, professionals must learn from those who
have mastered the art of practice.164 We have staffed our in-house pro-
gram with experienced practitioners who remain in their positions long
161. Of the nine full-time clinical professors, six have their salaries linked to fees and another is
funded mostly through a government grant. Two are funded by the law school; one supervises the
externship program and the other is the Director of Clinical Education.
162. Nine full-time clinical professors are presently employed in the Law Offices. The Director
of Clinical Education is a tenured member of the faculty. Since 1981, the clinical professors have
been eligible for faculty status, but cannot vote on promotion and tenure. Clinical professors do not
have tenure but receive renewable long-term contracts.
163. If the clinical professor generates fees lower than her salary in a given year, she must pay
back a penalty to the law school. By incorporating this provision in the clinical law professor's
contract, the law school can more easily predict the costs of its clinical program for the year because
it is more likely that the clinical professor will bring in fees at least equal to her salary. In the entire
thirteen years in which the fee-generating model has been in existence at Chicago-Kent, no clinical
professor has had to pay a penalty under this provision. I plan to provide an analysis of the fee
generating contract and explain how the program works in detail in a future article.
164. SCHON supra note 41, at 13.
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enough to become experienced clinical teachers as well. Our method of
compensation enables us to reward the clinical professors for developing
their lawyering and clinical teaching skills, whereas many law schools
paying low salaries overload clinicians with clinical, non-clinical aca-
demic, and administrative responsibilities, all to the detriment of their
becoming master practitioners and remaining clinical professors.
Our fee-generating model will enable us to offer the students in our
new program clinical practice experiences in non-poverty law fields such
as estate planning, real estate transactions, and corporate litigation. Our
students can perform in a more realistic practice environment 65 encom-
passing problems of economic decision-making, caseload management,
and issues of professional responsibility-problems which only arise in
fee settings. And it will provide our students with the opportunity to
learn about the mechanics of fee practice, including charging and collect-
ing fees.
Finally, students will have sequenced clinical education from the
start of their second year through graduation, including simulation, live-
client in-house practice, and externships. All clinical courses will have
reflective practicum components.
VIII. CONCLUSION
If the new program is as successful as we believe it will be, we will
suggest offering it to a greater number of students, perhaps to most of the
student body. How costly would that be? I believe that we could pro-
vide the entire student body with an extensive clinical curriculum and
sufficient education in skills and values at much less cost than one might
expect through the judicious use of our fee-generating model and
externships.
The new program is a work-in-progress. The mix of courses may
not be correct; our teaching methodologies may need improvement. But
it is a beginning, and true to the spirit of reflective learning we will per-
form, reflect on our performance, and from that process, learn to do it
right.
165. Every case in the Law Offices is the responsibility of a clinical professor. Students assigned
to the case assist the clinical professor in the same way a newly-hired associate assists a partner in a
law firm, through performing themselves and by observing performances of their supervisors. Thus,
we emphasize learning by modelling as well as by doing.
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APPENDIX
Dispute Resolution: Litigation and its Alternatives
The program will be limited to 30 students in each class, beginning with the class
admitted for the 1993-94 academic year, chosen from applicants on the basis of their
academic potential, performance in law school, and reasons for entering the program.
Even though the remainder of the student body will be required to complete 84 credits to
receive a J.D., students in the program will be required to complete 90 hours of credit to
receive a J.D. Students in the program will take a standard first-year load and will be
given some special extra-curricular programs. See infra Appendix endnote 3. Yearly, no
more than three graduates of the program will be eligible for selection as Research Fel-
lows who will spend a fourth year at the law school as practicing clinical lawyers
(1/2 time), teaching assistants (1/4 time), and researchers ('/4 time).
Current Curriculum
FIRST YEAR 1
Torts 3 Civil Pro. 4
Criminal Law 4 Contracts 4
Justice 3 Property 4
Legal Writing 3 Legal Writing 2
13 14
SECOND YEAR
In-House Clinic 42 In-House Clinic 5
Evidence 3 Trial Advocacy I 3
Pretrial 3  2 ADR4  2
Con. Law 4
135  10
1. During the first year of this program, students will be selected for the program sometime
after their first semester of law school. Thereafter, some students will be selected during the summer
preceding their first year of law school and some will be selected after their first semester of law
school. Starting sometime during their first year of law school, the students in the program will have
programmatic obligations in addition to their first year course requirements, as follows: Students
will become active members of selected bar associations, attend selected continuing legal education
programs, and enroll in several intensive weekend law school seminars in which they will receive
classroom and simulation instruction about the skills necessary to handle a legal dispute.
2. Students will be required to choose from two of the three clinics: tax, civil, or criminal.
Each semester one credit of the clinical course will be graded on the basis of performance in the
classroom component of the clinic. In addition, the clinical faculty will teach the materials currently
required as Advanced Legal Research. By consolidating that required course with the in-house
clinic, the students will gain additional hours in which to take elective courses.
3. This is a new course to be taught either by a clinical faculty member or an adjunct. A
number of people who teach in the trial advocacy program might be interesting pretrial teachers.
This course also will include materials in legal drafting sufficient to fulfill the legal drafting writing
requirement.
4. This course will encompass the underlying principles and the relevant legal doctrine
regarding the full range of alternative dispute resolution devices including negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, and court-annexed dispute resolution devices. In addition to this course, students will be
expected to take ADR II. See infra note 9.
5. To the extent that students want to take additional hours in the second year, they may take




In-House 5 Externship6  4
Seminar 7  2 Perspectives8  3
ADR II 9  3
Prof. Resp.' 0  2
12 7
In addition to these requirements, students will be required to fulfill additional
distributional requirements: seven credit hours of "dispute resolution" courses; and nine
hours of other core courses. The remaining five hours could be taken as electives from
the remainder of the curriculum including the clinical education, dispute resolution, or
core curricula. Each student will be assigned to a program advisor who will guide the
student in determining which distributional and elective courses to take.






Law Office Management 1  2
Trial Advocacy II 3
Appellate Procedure 2
Core (9 hours)




Commercial Law I 3
Criminal Procedure 3
Personal Income Tax 3
6. Students will have the choice of taking either a judicial or advanced externship course to
fulfill their externship requirement. If students wish to take two semesters of externships, they will
be required to take one of their in-house clinic courses during a summer semester.
7. The seminar requirement could be met by taking any approved seminar. Students will be
encouraged to take a course (or independent study in lieu of a seminar) that will compliment the
dispute resolution curriculum.
8. The students would begin their law school careers with our orientation program about the
relationship of justice and legal rules, take a course in justice in their first year, take a course in
professional responsibility, and end with a perspectives course in which they would consider matters
of justice in the context of their educational program. The perspectives requirement would be
fulfilled by the standard course in jurisprudence, a comparative law course, or any other approved
perspectives course.
9. The advanced Alternative Dispute Resolution course would be a skills course and would
expose students to performance in a variety of dispute resolution situations. We have not yet
decided whether the students will obtain their skills training in a live-client or simulation setting.
10. This course could be taken in either the second or third year.
11. This would be a new course dealing with the economic, legal, and practical concerns of
running a legal practice. The course would deal with issues relevant to solo and firm practice. It
also would deal with issues such as providing legal services to the poor and fulfilling the pro bono
obligations of the lawyer and firm.
12. This is not an exhaustive list. The courses listed have traditionally been high enrollment
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Completion of this program will ensure that a student receives a well-rounded
education including traditional doctrinal and case analysis education, an understanding
of the theoretical and ethical foundations of law, training in legal writing, serious
concentration in the skills and subjects of dispute resolution, and clinical instruction in
using all of their professional knowledge to represent clients with legal disputes. Students
who graduate from the program must take a minimum of 53 credits of traditional
classroom courses (General Knowledge-28, Legal Writing-7, Theory and Ethics-8,
and Dispute Resolution-Doctrinal-lO) and a minimum of 25 credits from clinical and
other non-traditional courses (Clinical Education-18 and Dispute Resolution-Non-
Doctrinal-7). The remaining 12 credits consist of 7 credits of distributional
requirements in the Dispute Resolution curriculum and 5 credits of Electives and may be

















Legal Writing I (3)
Legal Writing 11 (2)
Advanced Research (part of In-house clinic)
Legal Drafting (part of Pretrial course)
Seminar (2)
Justice (3)




In-house clinic and externships (18)






Trial Advocacy I (3)
ADR (2)
5 hours
THE FOURTH YEAR PROGRAM
After completion of the requirements for the three-year program for a J.D., students
will receive a certificate and become eligible to serve as a Research Fellow. Research
Fellows will spend a fourth year at Chicago-Kent. Each year, no more than three gradu-
ates of the program in dispute resolution (and possibly one or two other highly qualified
classes at the law school. Hence, they have evolved into "core" courses. This list might be enlarged
to accommodate other large enrollment courses that the faculty view as critical to a lawyer's career.




law school graduates) will be selected as Research Fellows on the basis of their academic
performance at the law school. As Research Fellows they will receive a $15,000 a year
stipend 14 to spend the year refining their talents as lawyers.
First, they will be required to take the Illinois Bar Exam in the summer following
graduation.' 5 This will enable them to serve as associate attorneys in the Law Offices of
Chicago-Kent. As associates, they will be expected to work half-time as lawyers. Sec-
ond, each Fellow will teach quarter-time in the Dispute Resolution curriculum in the
ADR, Pretrial, or Law Office Management course. They also will help in the classroom
component of the In-House Clinics. Third, each Fellow will be expected to spend quar-
ter-time writing a research paper, in consultation with a faculty member, concerning a
topic relevant to Dispute Resolution. The goal will be to publish these papers in a law
review.
14. The law school is looking for external funding either from a donor or from a funding
agency to pay these stipends. Because the Law Offices bills for its services, the hours worked by the
Fellows could be charged to paying clients and, hence, the law school would be reimbursed for the
cost of the fellowships.
15. The law school would work to secure funding to pay for the bar review course since Re-
search Fellows would likely lose the opportunity to have sbmeone else pay for their preparation
course.
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